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Energy prices are volatile, affect every consumer and industry in the econ-
omy, and are impacted by regulations including gas taxes and carbon pricing.
Like the pass-through literature in general, the growing energy pass-through
literature focuses on marginal prices. However, multi-part pricing is common
in energy retail pricing. I examine the retail natural gas market, showing that
while marginal prices exhibit full or nearly full pass-through, fixed fees exhibit
negative pass-through. This is consistent with the stated desire by utilities and
regulators to prevent ‘bill shock.’ I discuss implications for pass-through esti-
mation and for proposed alternative pricing structures for regulated utilities.
I. INTRODUCTION
Energy price pass-through has received much recent attention (Marion and Mueh-
legger [2011]; Borenstein and Kellogg [2014]; Fabra and Reguant [2014]; Ganapati et
al. [2016]; Stolper [2016]; Knittel et al. [2017]; Lade and Bushnell [2017]; Muehlegger
and Sweeney [2017]; Chu et al. [2017]). Energy prices can be extremely volatile, they
impact every consumer and every industry in the economy, and they are frequently
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impacted by regulations including gasoline taxes and carbon pricing. In this paper,
I examine pass-through in the natural gas market. In the last two decades, natural
gas prices have seen tremendous variation arising from both supply-side shocks such
as the fracking revolution and demand-side shocks such as polar vortex winters. The
average year-on-year real upstream change (in absolute value) over 2002-2015 was 20
percent, and more than 10 percent of months saw a year-on-year price change of at
least 40 percent. Because gas input costs are observable, the natural gas distribution
utility sector provides an ideal setting for understanding firm behavior.
Natural gas distribution firms—which provide the delivery of gas via pipelines
through cities to homes and businesses—face high fixed costs and relatively low
marginal cost. The distribution sector is thus a natural monopoly, and it is typically
regulated by quasi-judicial public utility commissions. Retail prices are determined
so that firms can recover costs plus a return for their investors. The textbook model
of efficient utility pricing is thus a two-part tariff: a volumetric fee set to recover
marginal costs, and a lump-sum customer charge (on, e.g., a monthly basis) set to
recover fixed costs (Viscusi et al. [2005]). As such, multi-part tariffs are common in
retail natural gas pricing, as well as in other utility settings such as electricity and
water distribution. The energy price pass-through literature, like the pass-through lit-
erature in general, typically examines the impact of marginal cost shocks on marginal
prices. In this paper, I examine pass-through to both marginal prices and fixed fees,
finding that while marginal prices exhibit full or nearly full pass-through, fixed fees
exhibit negative pass-through.
These results are consistent with stated objectives of utilities and their price reg-
ulators. Regulators are typically charged not only with setting prices that are cost-
based, but that also promote other goals, such as being easily interpretable and not
unduly discriminatory. Most importantly for this paper, one of the other objectives
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frequently stated is something along the lines of avoiding ‘unnecessary rate shock.’1
A version of this objective comes from a text used by many price regulators, Princi-
ples of Public Utility Rates (1988), by Bonbright et al., which includes as a ‘desirable
attribute’ the ‘[s]tability and predictability of the rates themselves, with a minimum
of unexpected changes seriously adverse to rate-payers and with a sense of historical
continuity’ (p. 383).
I first provide background on retail price structures and on the regulatory process
by which prices are set. I next model the regulator’s problem when setting retail
prices. In a simple two-period framework, I show how fixed fees might be used to
smooth bill volatility induced by changes in input prices.
Next, I use survey data on utility fixed fees to show that they are negatively
impacted by gas input costs. Then, using a comprehensive dataset on utility in-
put costs, revenues, and volumes transacted, I recover the typical price structure of
natural gas distributors in the US. In particular, I estimate the response of both vol-
umetric charges and fixed fees to changes in input costs. Consistent with anecdotal
and survey evidence regarding frequent updating of gas commodity charges,2 I show
essentially full pass-through to volumetric prices. I show that every $1/mcf (dollar
per thousand cubic feet) shock to citygate prices3 leads to a $1/mcf change in the vol-
umetric component of retail prices, although around half of the pass-through comes
with a lag of at least one month. In addition, I again show that high input prices
lead to reduced fixed fees, such that the bill total is smoothed. A positive shock of
$1/mcf at the citygate level leads to a decrease in the fixed fee of $0.4 per residential
customer per month. At the average quantity purchased, this would imply that 6
percent of a price shock is smoothed away, i.e. does not appear in the change to the
bill total. That is, bill totals are less volatile than would be expected from input cost
volatility. These results are robust to an array of alternative specifications, under
3
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which I estimate that 3 to 18 percent of the price shock is smoothed away. Overall,
these results are consistent with both the model of the regulator’s objective and with
the stated objective of lessening ‘bill shock.’
Moreover, I provide evidence that utility expenditures are impacted. Using de-
tailed panel data on the expenditures of over 200 large investor-owned utilities, I show
that capital expenditures fall when gas input prices are high. This matches anecdo-
tal evidence from the electricity and natural gas industries that the low gas prices
induced by fracking have allowed utilities to engage in more capital investment than
they otherwise would have. Recent discussions around aging utility infrastructure
have emphasized questions about how to finance infrastructure upgrades (Hausman
and Muehlenbachs [2019]), and these results suggest that utilities have looked to raise
the necessary funds in ways that protect consumers from bill shock.
The paper contributes to a better understanding of both firm and regulator behav-
ior in natural monopoly settings, an area of interest to the energy economics literature.
The most directly related previous work has examined other aspects of retail pricing
decisions in the natural gas market, particularly the presence of outsized volumetric
mark-ups (Davis and Muehlegger [2010]; Borenstein and Davis [2012]). For a discus-
sion of pricing decisions and risk-shifting between utilities and consumers, see Beecher
and Kihm [2016]. The results are also closely related to work on political pressure on
utility regulators (Joskow [1974]; Joskow et al. [1996]; McRae and Meeks [2016]). For
instance, Joskow [1974] writes that the ‘primary concern of regulatory commissions
has been to keep nominal prices from increasing... Consumer groups and their rep-
resentatives (including politicians) tend to be content if the nominal prices they are
charged for services are constant or falling’ (pp 298–299). Other work on retail pric-
ing decisions for utilities includes Knittel [2003], which examines cross-subsidization
consistent with interest group pressure, and Levinson and Silva [2018], which exam-
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ines how price structures might respond to concerns about income inequality. More
generally, a long literature has examined utility and regulator behavior (Joskow et al.
[1996]; Guthrie [2006]; Leaver [2009]; Borenstein et al. [2012]; Abito [2016]; Lim and
Yurukoglu [2018]). Non-academic papers providing recommendations for utilities and
commissions for dealing with rate shock include Graves et al. [2007] and Kolbe et al.
[2013]. This paper’s contribution is to examine how multi-part pricing responds to
the potential for political pressure.
Also closely related is the large literature on pass-through in energy markets from
wholesale to retail prices. A large strand of this literature aims to understand asym-
metric pass-through, in which prices rise more rapidly than they fall (Borenstein et
al. [1997]; Johnson [2002]; Davis and Hamilton [2004]; Tappata [2009]; Lewis [2011]).
Other strands of the literature have instead focused on how taxes and other marginal
costs are passed through in, for instance, electricity and fuel markets (Marion and
Muehlegger [2011]; Borenstein and Kellogg [2014]; Fabra and Reguant [2014]; Stolper
[2016]; Knittel et al. [2017]). Because energy markets are impacted by taxes and
other regulatory costs (such as cap and trade markets), understanding pass-through
to retail prices is important.
The results on the importance of bill volatility to regulators is currently of ad-
ditional policy relevance, as it has surfaced in discussions around real-time pricing
in electricity (Borenstein [2005, 2013]; Beecher and Kihm [2016]) and around retail
choice (Hortacsu et al. [2017]). Policy changes such as real-time pricing could in-
crease bill volatility, and these results suggest that this could be a real concern for
price regulators and/or consumers. At the same time, the rise of renewables implies
that the welfare gains to real-time pricing are growing (Imelda et al. [2018]).
The results on pass-through and price setting are also related to the large industrial
organization literature on mark-ups. Of most direct relevance is work on bill shock in
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cellular telephone service (Grubb [2012, 2015]; Grubb and Osborne [2015]). That set
of papers examines the welfare implications of cellular pricing plans in which overage
charges can substantially increase a customer’s bill. A key difference with the natural
gas sector that I investigate is that bill shock for cellular service arises not because
of exogenous shocks to input costs, but rather because firms use non-linear pricing in
which quantity shocks push customers onto a much higher marginal price. In contrast,
I investigate a setting in which firms adjust their prices to smooth exogenous cost
shocks. More generally, though, two-part tariffs are found in many settings beyond
the natural gas industry that I study. Multi-part payment schemes are used in credit
card networks, in clubs with membership dues and usage fees, in the royalty and
bonus system in mineral extraction, etc. My results suggest that in settings with
non-linear prices, pass-through should be evaluated for all price components.
Finally, the results on the stickiness of bill totals relate to the macroeconomic
literature on nominal rigidities (Bils and Klenow [2004]; Nakamura and Steinsson
[2008]; Boivin et al. [2009]; Kehoe and Midrigan [2015]; Gorodnichenko and Weber
[2016]), offering support for one of the explanations for sticky prices in that litera-
ture. While some models of sticky prices rely on menu costs, another set of models
considers the role of consumer antagonism. These papers hypothesize that customers
respond negatively to price changes, leading to loss of brand loyalty, search for an
alternative product or supplier, boycotts, or other forms of demand decreases (Sibly
[2002]; Rotemberg [2005]; Anderson and Simester [2010]; Rotemberg [2011]). Simi-
larly, some of the pass-through literature in energy markets has focused on models
in which rising prices induce customers to search more or otherwise transfer loyalty
(Davis and Hamilton [2004]; Lewis [2011]). The setting I explore is more closely re-
lated to these consumer antagonism models than to, e.g. the menu cost models; it
is not that menu costs are high for some technological reason (gas input costs are
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automatically incorporated in bill totals) but rather that firms or price regulators
deliberately smooth cost shocks to avoid outcry.
In the consumer antagonism literature, firms are attempting to avoid the switching
by consumers of products or suppliers. That is one potential explanation for the
behavior I observe, since fuel switching away from natural gas is possible, and also
since some states have retail choice programs. However, these options are limited
(for instance, in most states retail choice programs are non-existent or have very
limited participation), so for many consumers, no alternative is available. In that
case, demand is not directly impacted by bill shock. Rather, the setting is consistent
with the firm or the commission seeking to avoid negative press, customer complaints
to call centers, or some other form of political pressure. It is thus consistent with
the idea of perceived ‘fairness’ in utility pricing, akin to what is described by Zajac
[1985]. The consumer antagonism channel is of interest in many settings beyond
utility pricing. While menu costs may decrease with technological change, such as
the rise of online retailers, the potential for consumer antagonism as a source of sticky
prices is likely to continue to be important.
This paper proceeds as follows. Section II. provides background on utility pricing.
Section III. provides a model of retail pricing with and without the desire to avoid bill
shock. Section IV. shows empirical results for the price structure as well as capital
expenditures. Section V. concludes with thoughts on welfare and policy implications.
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II. BACKGROUND
II(i). Natural Gas Utilities
Natural gas providers in the US primarily face two forms of regulation. The majority
of customers are served by investor-owned utilities, companies that face price regu-
lations at the state level and that generally serve a large number of customers. Ap-
proximately 300 such companies currently serve US customers. Other customers are
served instead by municipal providers. Approximately 900 such municipal providers
currently exist, although their service territories are much smaller than those of the
investor-owned utilities—overall, investor-owned utilities sell 90 percent of all volume
distributed.
Investor-owned utilities are not free to set retail prices nor to determine capi-
tal expenditures; instead prices and expenditures are regulated by state-level public
utility commissions. Commissions are tasked with ensuring that prices are ‘just and
reasonable.’ The typical investor-owned utility uses a price structure composed of
three parts. The first part is the gas cost recovery charge;4 this is a volumetric price
set equal to the utility’s purchasing cost. This price is typically updated frequently
(e.g., monthly) via automatic adjustment clauses.5 In addition, the utility typically
charges both a volumetric mark-up, known as a distribution charge,6 and a fixed
charge.7 These two components of the retail price are not updated automatically;
instead the utility must go before regulators and justify any change to these com-
ponents of the retail prices. A lengthy quasi-judicial regulatory process follows, in
which the firm provides evidence relating to its costs, which the utility commission
then weighs against evidence provided by interest groups such as rate-payer advo-
cates. Volumetric mark-ups and fixed fees accordingly tend to change only every
8
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couple of years.8
Time series of these bill components are presented in Figure 1, for two large
investor-owned utilities. The monthly fixed charge (thick black line), around 8 to
14 dollars in nominal terms, changes several times for the left-hand utility and just
once for the right-hand utility. For these two utilities, fixed fees are rising in nominal
terms over this time period. According to a nation-wide survey by the American Gas
Association, fixed fees have generally been rising in nominal terms. Historically, this
approximately kept pace with inflation. Increases in fixed charges in real terms have
only come since around 2010 (American Gas Association [2015]).
The volumetric mark-up in Figure 1 (dashed grey) changes at the same time as the
fixed fee. In contrast, the gas cost recovery charge changes approximately monthly
and closely matches the state-wide citygate price.
[Place Figure 1 about here]
The specifics of how these three price components are implemented vary across
utilities, across time, and across customer types (‘classes’) within a utility. For in-
stance, some utilities use flat volumetric fees while others use increasing (or decreas-
ing) block prices. Economic theory provides some guidance on these components—
namely that marginal price should be set equal to marginal cost—but other aspects
are necessarily guided more by distributional and political considerations. For in-
stance, an efficient two-part tariff might use a flat volumetric charge equal to the gas
input cost, with a fixed charge set to recover all remaining fixed costs. A remaining
distributional question, then, is how to allocate fixed charges across customer types
(e.g. residential versus industrial users; or low-income versus high-income groups).
Unless elasticities along the extensive margin are large (i.e. customers respond to fixed
charges by disconnecting from the service), the latter question has little importance
in terms of economic efficiency but can be of great importance politically.
9
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II(ii). Stability as a Price-Setting Goal
Both utilities and commissions refer in their documents to a guiding set of principles
for price-setting for gas and electric service provision. The principles (Bonbright et
al. [1988]) relate to economic efficiency, but also to equity, revenue adequacy and sta-
bility, bill stability, and customer satisfaction. Of particular interest for this paper is
Bonbright’s third principle, quoted above, regarding rate stability and predictability.
This is sometimes summarized as avoiding ‘rate shock’ or ‘bill shock’ and sometimes
as the principle of ‘gradualism’ in implementing price changes.
For instance, testimony in a Maryland rate case stated that a ‘critical ratemaking
goal is continuity with past rates and avoiding rate and bill shocks. This goal is
often recognized in Commission decisions that move classes toward more equality in
rate of return without imposing very large increases.’9 Similar reasoning appears
in rate cases in numerous states. For instance, a New York politician submitted
comments to the Public Service Commission to oppose gas and electric price hikes
in the wake of energy price hikes caused by hurricanes Katrina and Rita, saying ‘the
“rate shock” coupled with already skyrocketing energy costs could threaten the health
and safety of many families.’10 In addition to opposition to any price increase at all,
some documents advocate for under-collection of a utility’s cost in the wake of high
input prices,11 or phasing in price increases.12 While residential users, particularly
low-income users, are frequently mentioned, business users are as well,13 and prior
work has suggested that large industrial customers are able to exert pressure (Joskow
et al. [1996]). Sometimes rate shock is mentioned in the context of simply providing
additional information to prepare customers, but frequently the timing and magnitude
of price changes also adjusts to incorporate concerns about bill stability (Graves et
al. [2007]; Edison Electric Institute [2016]).
10
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Anecdotal evidence from several sources suggests that rate shock avoidance im-
pacts not only retail prices, but also companies’ capital expenditures. One trade
magazine described an industry analyst’s 2012 comments by writing ‘low-cost natu-
ral gas has provided “headroom” in electricity prices, which has helped utilities pursue
“significant capital spending” plans with little risk of rate shock.’14 While that quote
focuses on electric utilities, a press release from the American Gas Association in
2012 stated that ‘[a]dvances in American technology for natural gas production have
unlocked an abundance of this domestic clean energy source which has contributed to
huge savings for residential and commercial customers. America’s natural gas utilities
are using this opportunity to continue to improve our nation’s natural gas infrastruc-
ture, and they are working with local regulators to develop innovative models for
making these capital investments possible.’15 Similarly, slides shown to investors by
a major natural gas company, CenterPoint Energy, stated that the ‘[l]ow natural gas
price environment in the U.S. reduces the potential that increased capital investment
will cause customer rate shock.’16
Overall, the exact way a utility or commission might incorporate rate shock avoid-
ance in its price setting is likely to vary. The goal of this paper is not to provide a
comprehensive catalogue or break-down, but rather to investigate how typical retail
prices respond to cost changes in ways that are consistent with rate shock avoid-
ance. As such, I leave aside strategies that focus on informational campaigns rather
than adjustments to retail prices themselves, although future research on information
provision would be of value.17 I also leave aside the strategic interactions between
utilities and commissions related to price setting. That is, I do not take a stand on
the extent to which utilities versus commissions drive bill-smoothing behavior. Future
work could explicitly model the strategic interactions of these two players, perhaps
incorporating the behavior of rate-payer advocates as well, in the spirit of Leaver
11
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[2009] or Abito [2016].18
II(iii). Other Strategies for Reducing Price Volatility
Another strategy for mitigating retail price volatility is hedging to smooth input
cost volatility.19 Utilities use several forms of hedging: physical storage of gas, long-
term contracts, and financial instruments. Because of the automatic pass-through
clauses in many jurisdictions, utilities may have limited financial incentive to hedge.
Instead, hedging is frequently justified by the desire to provide stability for retail
prices (Graves and Levine [2010]; Costello [2016]). However, analysts have noted
that regulatory risk limits the amount of hedging actually done by utilities: utilities
may be punished by regulators for hedging that ex-post was not in the utility’s favor
(Graves and Levine [2010]; Borenstein et al. [2012]; Costello [2016]). The extent of
hedging has varied over time, but recent reports indicate that the use of storage is
nearly universal (perhaps accounting for a quarter or a third of winter volume) and the
use of financial instruments is also widespread (typically at a term of around a year)
(Energy Information Administration [2007]; Graves and Levine [2010]; American Gas
Association [2016]; Costello [2016]). While long-term contracts are also used, they
are frequently written with first-of-month pricing rather than fixed pricing (Graves
and Levine [2010]; American Gas Association [2016]). Below, I consider how hedging
would enter my model as well as how it could impact my empirical results.
III. MODEL
I begin with a simple model of the regulator’s behavior, in which the regulator observes
all costs faced by the utility, knows the consumer’s utility function, and sets prices to
maximize social welfare. Suppose there are two periods, in each of which the firm faces
12
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input costs, composed of variable costs c and fixed costs G. The regulator sets retail
prices in order to maximize social welfare, accounting for the utility that consumers
derive from consuming quantity q of gas, and subject to a budget neutrality constraint
(over the two periods; i.e. banking and borrowing are assumed to be permitted). The
regulator is able to use both variable prices p and fixed fees F . The regulator’s
problem is then:
max
p1,p2,F1,F2
U(q1) + U(q2)− c1q1 − c2q2
s.t. p1q1 + F1 + p2q2 + F2 = c1q1 + c2q2 +G1 +G2
At the optimum, the regulator simply sets marginal price equal to marginal cost:
p1 = c1 and p2 = c2. The regulator can select, at the optimum, any F1 and F2 such
that F1 + F2 = G1 +G2. This is the standard two-part tariff typically seen in utility
pricing, in which marginal price is set equal to marginal cost and fixed fees are used
to cover all remaining fixed costs.
Now suppose that the regulator faces an additional penalty for volatility in the
bill total. To motivate this penalty, suppose that consumers put political pressure
on regulators when bills change, as in Joskow et al. [1996].20 This could be because
consumers face credit constraints, or it could result from consumers judging utility
pricing ‘fairness’ by what is most easily observable to them—their bill total; this is
related to the models described by Zajac [1985] and Kahneman et al. [1986].21 The
regulator’s problem then becomes:
max
p1,p2,F1,F2
U(q1) + U(q2)− c1q1 − c2q2 − f(p1q1 + F1 − p2q2 − F2)
13
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s.t. p1q1 + F1 + p2q2 + F2 = c1q1 + c2q2 +G1 +G2
Consider a quadratic penalty function: f = α (p1q1 + F1 − p2q2 − F2)
2. Here α is
a constant denoting how large a penalty the regulator faces; i.e. how much consumer
utility is affected by bill volatility. At the optimum, marginal prices are unaffected;
p1 = c1 and p2 = c2. However, fixed fees are now set at the optimum such that bill
totals are equalized:
F1 = G−
1
2
(c1q1 − c2q2)
F2 = G+
1
2
(c1q1 − c2q2)
where G = 1
2
(G1 +G2). Thus the fixed fee will be set lower in the period with higher
variable cost.
Several aspects of this model are worth noting. First, the smoothing of the fixed fee
when the regulator faces a penalty for bill volatility does not depend on the magnitude
of that penalty, for this quadratic function. The α parameter drops out and does not
impact the fixed fees F . As such, the regulator will engage in this bill smoothing
no matter how small the penalty is. Even if only some portion of consumers exert
pressure on the regulator,22 or even if all consumers care only a small amount about
volatility, bill smoothing will occur.
Second, in theory it is possible at the optimum that the fixed fee would be need
to be negative in one of the two periods. This would occur if the volatility in variable
cost is sufficiently large relative to the magnitude of fixed costs G. In practice, this is
unlikely to be the case for the natural gas sector analyzed empirically in this paper.
14
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The typical quantity sold to a residential household in the US is under 7 mcf per
month (shown below, in Table II). Since the standard deviation of the citygate price
is around $2.5/mcf, a one standard deviation change in the citygate price would lead
to a $17 change in the bill total. The typical utility collects $35 per month per
residential household in fees beyond what is needed to cover gas costs (i.e., to cover
fixed costs), indicating that fixed costs are large relative to volatility in variable costs,
so negative fees would be unlikely to be needed.
Third, this presentation uses a symmetric (quadratic) penalty function. One could
imagine an asymmetric penalty function, in which there was no welfare loss for falling
bill totals, but a quadratic penalty for rising bill totals. In that case, if cost falls from
period 1 to period 2, any combination of fixed fees satisfying F1 + F2 = G1 +G2 can
be used, as above, provided that the bill total does not rise.23 If cost rises from period
1 to period 2, then the combination of fixed fees such that bill totals are equalized
(or weakly falling) is used. For this simplified model, straightforward asymmetric
behavior of fixed fees might not necessarily appear empirically, since the regulator
can choose from a large menu of fixed fee combinations without incurring penalty.
It is worth thinking about two alternative versions of the model that could also
lead to observed smoothing. First, consider the extensive margin, i.e. the consumer’s
decision to enter or exit the gas market, thus incurring or avoiding the fixed customer
charge.24 The above model assumes there is no extensive margin. In a setting where
the firm has no discretion over the level of fixed costs, only over the timing of their
recovery, and where consumers are forward-looking, the extensive margin is unlikely
to be central for the analysis. Total fixed fees across the two periods are at the same
level with and without smoothing, and an informed customer will take into account
the vector of fixed charges across time. Thus the smoothing may impact when a
customer enters the market, but is unlikely to affect whether the customer enters
15
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the market. However, if the firm were able to adjust the total amount of fixed cost
recovery, or if the consumer were myopic, then it would be possible to imagine a
setting where bill smoothing is used to prevent consumers from exiting the market.
Specifically, as the marginal price rises, the consumer surplus triangle (gross of fixed
fees) falls. If it falls enough, then consumer surplus net of the fixed fee becomes
negative, and the consumer chooses to exit the market.25 Note this intuition is in line
with the consumer antagonism literature cited above. The empirical analysis that
follows explores the possibility of heterogeneity across states along this dimension.
Another extension of the model would lead to a slightly different explanation for
observed bill smoothing. Suppose the utility hedges a portion of its volume – using
storage, a long-term contract, or a financial instrument. Then if the marginal cost
of gas rises, this change affects only a portion of volume purchased and sold. In this
case, even though the utility would adjust its marginal price upward, the fixed fee
could be adjusted downward with the firm still meeting its revenue constraint. To the
extent that hedging was motivated by a desire to keep bill totals stable (as described
in Section II(iii).), this would simply imply a different mechanism by which fixed fees
are used to smooth bill shock. Below, I discuss the role of hedging in my empirical
analysis.
Overall, this two-period model shows a context where the desire to avoid bill
shock leads to bill smoothing. Under the assumptions made here (no uncertainty,
homogenous customers, etc.), marginal prices are not distorted, and fixed fees are
used to fully smooth all variable cost shocks. As a result, one would empirically
observe negative pass-through to fixed fees.
It is possible that in a more complicated model, partial but not full smoothing
would occur. For instance, if there is uncertainty, the form smoothing would take
and the magnitude of the smoothing could depend on the regulator’s expectation
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over the path of future cost shocks. Note also that in this simplified model there
is no volumetric mark-up at the optimum, although in practice such mark-ups exist
(Davis and Muehlegger [2010]). The presence of a mark-up could impact whether
and how fixed fee smoothing is used by a regulator, and smoothing could be used for
the mark-up as well as the fixed fee. To examine whether bill smoothing occurs in
practice, and if so, how large it is and what form it takes, I next turn to empirical
pass-through analysis.
IV. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
IV(i). Data on Fixed Fees and Input Costs
The typical utility offers multiple pricing plans, some components of which change
frequently, and unfortunately there exists no dataset that aggregates this information
across the over 1,300 utility providers in the US.26 However, I begin by leveraging three
limited datasets: a survey by the American Gas Association, a survey by Memphis
Light, Gas, and Water (a municipal utility), and my own retail pricing search.
The American Gas Association has periodically conducted an unbalanced survey
of fixed fees at around 150 to 200 utilities.27 Survey data are provided in AGA reports
at the utility level for the years 2010 and 2015, and averaged to the Census division
level (e.g., New England, Middle Atlantic, East North Central, etc.) for the years
2006, 2010, and 2015. The average residential fee reported across the three years is
$11 per customer per month.
Second, the municipal utility of Memphis Light, Gas and Water (MLGW) con-
ducts an annual survey of retail pricing at several dozen utilities, including natural
gas (as well as electricity and water).28 Their annual publication does not report fixed
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fees per se, but it does report residential bill totals at different quantity levels, such
as 1 mcf, 5 mcf, etc. I use the bill totals for the two smallest quantities (1 mcf and
5 mcf) to back out the fixed fee; I also verify that using other quantity points gives
similar fixed fee estimates.29 The mean fixed fee in these data is $13 per customer
per month.
Finally, I collect residential tariff data for the 40 largest utilities in the US, using
a combination of searches of utility and commission websites, contacting utilities
directly, and the Internet Archive (archive.org). The resulting dataset is a monthly
panel of these utilities; the panel is unbalanced because of differential data availability
across utilities. Details on data collection are provided in the Appendix.30 Roughly
matching the AGA survey data, the mean fixed fee in these data is $12 per customer
per month. The mean volumetric mark-up is $4/mcf, and the mean gas commodity
charge is $6/mcf.
Reassuringly, the mean fixed fee is roughly comparable across the three datasets.
Additionally, while each dataset has limitations, they are likely to be different across
the sources, so no systematic error across the datasets is expected in my analysis.
While the AGA data are geographically quite aggregated, they at least represent a
large sample of utilities. The MLGW survey is not a random sample, but it provides
greater disaggregation (both cross-sectionally and temporally) than the AGA data.
And while my own data collection does not yield a balanced panel nor a random
sample, it does provide information at the monthly level for the largest utilities. It
also allows for examination of volumetric prices (including a breakdown into gas costs
and mark-ups), which are not in either the AGA or the MLGW data.
I also collect data on gas input costs to utilities. Specifically, I observe citygate
prices in dollars per thousand cubic feet ($/mcf). The data are at the monthly state
level, covering 1989 to 2015, and are from the Energy Information Administration
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(EIA) at the US Department of Energy. Recall that this citygate price is the price
paid by a utility at the point that natural gas enters the distribution system. The
price reported by the EIA is the quantity-weighted average across all utilities in a
state. Prices vary because of demand-side shocks like cold winters and supply-side
shocks like the fracking boom, with cross-sectional variation arising from pipeline
congestion (see, e.g., Marmer et al., 2007). I normalize all price variables to 2015
dollars, using the CPI-All Urban Less Energy. Note that since this citygate price
variable is the average purchase price paid by the utility, it is inclusive of the hedging
described in Section II(iii)..31 That is, any smoothing observed below is in addition
to smoothing that occurs via hedging.
For each of the three datasets, I regress the monthly fixed fee on the citygate
price, including fixed effects and a linear trend.32 The level at which the fixed fee
is applied varies across columns, since the cross-sectional unit varies. For Column 1,
fixed fees are applied to Census divisions (n = 9). For Column 2, a utility in a city
is the cross-sectional unit. For Column 3, the cross-sectional unit is a pricing plan at
a utility. Most utilities are represented in the dataset by a single pricing plan, but a
few have, for instance, both a ‘heating’ and a ‘non-heating’ rate. In that case, each
has its own fixed effect. Similarly, the frequency varies across datasets, based on data
availability. For Column 1, the data are at the annual level, albeit with 4 to 5 year
gaps. For Column 2, the data are annual, and for Column 3 they are monthly.
The idea is to leverage citygate price shocks, which are generally thought to come
from upstream wholesale price shocks, to estimate pass-through to retail fixed fees.
One identifying assumption is that fixed fees do not in turn impact citygate prices.
Below, I consider instrumental variables specifications to rule out this sort of endo-
geneity.
Results are presented in Table I. Column 1 shows a coefficient on citygate price
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of -0.47, statistically significant at the five percent level. This implies that for every
$1/mcf rise in the citygate price, the monthly fixed fee per customer falls by $0.47.
Recall that in this dataset, the median utility reports a fixed fee of around $11 per
month per customer. For this utility, a $1/mcf rise in the citygate price (roughly 20
percent of 2015 levels) would translate to a 4 percent fall in the fixed fee. As another
way of understanding the magnitude, consider that the average quantity consumed in
a month is around 6.6 mcf per residential customer; this would imply that a $1/mcf
rise in the citygate price would, absent smoothing, translate to an increase of $6.6 in
the bill total. However, with smoothing, $0.47 (or 7 percent) of this increase is muted
by the change to the fixed fee. Given the infrequency with which fixed fees adjust
(because they require rate case proceedings), it is not surprising that the smoothing
is only partial.
[Place Table I about here]
Column 2 shows that the magnitude using the MLGW data is -0.31, albeit with
noise. Note that this column uses standard errors that are two-way clustered by state
and year. Column 3, using the prices I collect at the 40 largest utilities, shows a point
estimate of -0.11, also statistically significant at the five percent level (standard errors
are again two-way clustered). Instrumental variable specifications, in the Appendix,
also show that citygate prices have a negative impact on fixed fees.
Finally, Columns 4 and 5 examine pass-through to volumetric prices, using the
unbalanced panel from the 40 largest utilities. Given that these estimates cannot be
compared across multiple datasets, in contrast to the results for fixed fees, they should
be taken as suggestive. Column 4 examines pass-through to the volumetric mark-up,
finding negative pass-through, i.e. smoothing. In contrast, gas cost recovery charges,
which are separately delineated on the typical bill, exhibit full pass-through – a coef-
ficient of one cannot be rejected at the five percent level (Column 5). These results
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are intuitive: automatic pass-through clauses yield full pass-through, but smoothing
may occur in volumetric mark-ups as well as in fixed charges. Because these results
are limited to a non-random subset of utilities, I next turn to an empirical strategy
that leverages a nationwide dataset.
IV(ii). Estimating Price Structures
The previous section demonstrated that across multiple sources of information on
utility retail pricing, there is negative pass-through of citygate prices to fixed fees.
Two limitations of those results are (1) the data are not a census of utilities; and
(2) only fixed fees are observed, rather than the entire price structure, for two of the
datasets. As such, I next leverage comprehensive information on prices and quantities
from the EIA. For 1989-2015, I observe monthly state-level data on retail revenue,
quantity sold, and customer counts33 for four categories of end-users: residential,
commercial, industrial, and electric power. The average retail price in these data
is not the marginal price; it is calculated simply as total revenue divided by total
quantity. In particular, it includes revenue from fixed fees charged to each customer
irrespective of their volume purchased.
Industrial and electric power data are observed only for a subset of years (begin-
ning in 2001 for industrial, 2002 for electric power). Moreover, the EIA reports that
data used to calculate the state-level average price represents a majority of volume
delivered for the residential and commercial sectors (97 percent for residential, 75
percent for commercial) whereas only 20 percent of industrial volumes delivered are
represented in the reported industrial price.34 Throughout my analysis, I focus on
the residential and commercial sectors, for which data are more complete.35
Table II provides summary statistics for these price, revenue, quantity, and cus-
tomer count variables.
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[Place Table II about here]
Leveraging these data is not as straightforward as regressing the retail price on the
citygate price, since the retail price averages across fixed fees and volumetric prices.
As such, I next use an econometric strategy to back out the typical price structure,
leveraging insights from Davis and Muehlegger [2010], hereafter DM. DM note that
components of the price structure can be empirically estimated from quantity and
revenue data. Their paper is motivated by a desire to understand how large volumetric
mark-ups are in the natural gas sector. They begin by defining net revenue as revenues
collected per customer, net of gas input costs. As described in Section II., a utility’s
revenues must cover two sets of costs: gas costs, which are determined by citygate
prices and by quantities purchased, and costs for the physical infrastructure. They
note that under a volumetric mark-up, net revenues are correlated with quantities
sold. As a result, changes in net revenues and quantity sold (both observable for all
utilities), can be used to empirically estimate the average volumetric mark-up. They
implement this insight by regressing net revenues on quantity sold:
(1) NRit = α+ βQit + εit,
where net revenue NR is in dollars per month per customer and quantity Q is in
mcf per month per customer. Because β gives the amount by which net revenue
per customer rises when quantity per customer rises, it provides an estimate of the
average volumetric mark-up on natural gas purchases. I expand on their equation to
estimate additional components of the price structure.
Re-writing Equation 1 using the NR variable’s definition:
(2) (Pit −MCit) ·Qit = α+ βQit + εit
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where P is the average retail price and MC is the citygate price, both in dollars per
mcf. Re-arranging:
(3) PitQit = α+ βQit + γMCitQit + εit.
That is, one can estimate the same equation as DM in a slightly more flexible form,
to be able to directly estimate the pass-through of the input cost to volumetric prices;
this pass-through is implicitly assumed to be equal to 1 in the DM specification. In
addition to providing a formal test of the pass-through, this allows for the inclusion
of, for instance, lagged input prices. Adding in these lagged prices, and noting that
the left-hand side PitQit is simply total revenue, yields:
(4) TRit = α+ βQit +
12∑
l=0
γlMCi,t−lQit + εit.
Moreover, by writing out the components of the retail prices, one obtains a formu-
lation that allows for estimating the magnitude of the monthly fixed fee per customer
as well as how it varies. Prices are typically set with a volumetric component as well
as a fixed fee, such that the total revenue per customer can be written as a combi-
nation of volumetric prices and fixed fees: TR = P volumetricQ + P fixedfee. Thus the
right-hand side of Equation 4 can be conceptually separated into components related
to volumetric prices (βQit +
∑12
l=0 γlMCi,t−lQit) and components related to the fixed
fee (α). In particular, the intercept in the DM estimating equation serves as an esti-
mate of the monthly fixed charge per customer, since it is the portion of revenue that
does not vary with quantity.
I can additionally include the citygate price as an explanatory variable, to under-
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stand how fixed fees vary in response to changes in citygate prices:
(5) TRit = α+ ψMCit + βQit +
12∑
l=0
γlMCi,t−lQit + εit
Thus ψ gives an estimate of how the fixed fee changes with the level of citygate prices,
since it is the component of the right-hand side that does not vary with quantity—
ψ is capturing just the impact of citygate prices on the fixed fee or non-volumetric
component of the bill.36 That is, ψ can be used to examine whether a desire to avoid
‘bill shock’ leads to smoothing of the bill total, via adjustment of the fixed fee.
Note that one might also be interested in whether the volumetric component of
the bill responds to citygate prices. This answer is simply given by the estimated
volumetric pass-through, γ. Unfortunately, while in practice the volumetric com-
ponent of a typical bill is composed of gas cost recovery charges and volumetric
mark-ups, γ combines the behavior of these two components. That is, smoothing via
volumetric mark-ups is not separately identified in this specification from incomplete
pass-through of gas cost charges. If one is willing to assume one-to-one pass-through
of gas cost charges (because of the automatic pass-through clauses described above),
then the coefficient γ can be tested against one, as a test of smoothing.
To summarize, the final specification is as follows:
(6) TRit = α+ ψMCit︸ ︷︷ ︸
Bill
smoothing:
adj. of
fixed fee
+ βQit︸︷︷︸
Volumetric
mark-up
+
12∑
l=0
γlMCi,t−lQit
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Instantaneous
and lagged
pass-through
+XitΓ + εit
Total revenue TR is in dollars per month per customer. The citygate price MC is in
dollars per mcf, and quantity Q is in mcf per month per customer. Bill smoothing via
adjustment of the fixed fee would show up as a negative estimate of ψ. The average
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volumetric mark-up is estimated by β, as in DM. Pass-through to the volumetric price
is estimated in the γ coefficients.
I include controls Xit: state-level fixed effects, a time trend, and state by calendar
month effects. Because natural gas demand is highly seasonal, with differing seasonal
effects across regions based on climate, the related empirical literature has generally
found state-specific month effects to be useful for both precision and identification.
Below, I show that the results are robust to alternative controls. Standard errors are
two-way clustered by state and by year.
The identifying assumption for Equation 6 is that any unobservables (i.e., com-
ponents of εit) are uncorrelated with MCit and Qit. If utility pricing were always
determined strictly by two-part pricing with a fixed fee and a volumetric fee, and if
there were no heterogeneity across time or across states, this would be very straight-
forward: unlike in many regression contexts, we would know the exact components
of the left-hand side variable and would simply be decomposing the variable into its
distinct parts.
The potential concerns for bias, then, would arise if Equation 6 failed to capture
features of utility pricing. For instance, in the case of increasing block or decreasing
block pricing, it is possible that the error term could be correlated with Qit. In the
survey data for the 40 largest utilities, the majority of the utilities have flat volumetric
fees, although increasing and decreasing block prices are both observed.37 I address
this concern below, by incorporating higher order terms of the quantity variable.
Below I also examine the assumption of heterogeneity across states and across times.
It has also been assumed for this equation that there are no unobservables corre-
lated with MCit. This would be violated if, for instance, the price of labor or other
firm inputs were correlated with citgyate prices. To alleviate this concern, I have
made the standard assumption that time series controls are adequate for absorbing
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such variation.
Finally, a remaining identifying assumption for this equation is that there is no
reverse causality from Pit (part of total revenue, the dependent variable) to MCit.
That is, retail prices do not impact citygate prices. In the related literature, citygate
prices are generally thought to be determined by upstream factors. The primary
mechanism by which one might worry that retail prices would impact citygate prices
would be via demand response. However, note that quantity demanded has been
controlled for in this equation. Below, I consider alternative specifications to rule out
concerns about endogeneity of the citygate price.
[Place Table III about here]
The results for Equation 6, separated by end-user type, are given in Table III.
Pass-through to the volumetric price (i.e., the coefficient on cost) is nearly complete,
albeit with lags. The instantaneous pass-through rate is 42 to 45 percent, with
additional pass-through (of 46 percent for residential, 43 percent for commercial)
coming with one to four months lag. The sum of the coefficients on the instantaneous
and lagged pass-through is 1.0 for both sectors; for neither sector is it statistically
different from 1. This is consistent with the frequent changes to the gas cost recovery
charge seen for the largest utilities with retail pricing data available (see Appendix).38
I estimate a positive volumetric mark-up (the coefficient on quantity). This is
similar for residential customers ($3.03/mcf) and commercial customers ($2.71/mcf).
This essentially matches DM, who estimate a volumetric mark-up of $3 to $4 for the
two sectors (when re-normalizing their 2007 values to 2015 dollars).
The novel result is that I estimate a bill smoothing effect, via the negative coeffi-
cient on citygate price. The coefficient on citygate price in the residential equation is
-0.38 and is significant at the one percent level. This implies that for every $1/mcf
rise in the citygate price, the monthly fixed fee per customer falls by $0.38. Recalling
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that the average quantity consumed in a month is around 6.6 mcf per residential
customer, this would imply that a $1/mcf rise in the citygate price would, absent
smoothing, translate to an increase of $6.6 in the bill total—however with smoothing,
$0.38 (or 6 percent) of this increase is muted by the change to the fixed fee. The
portion of a shock that is smoothed for the commercial sector is 4 percent, although
it is not statistically significant.
The magnitude of this smoothing effect is consistent with the survey evidence
presented in Section IV(i)., suggesting that empirically estimating the price structure
is an appropriate strategy where pricing data are limited. Recall that the survey
data used in Table I are not comprehensive, but they can be used with very few
identifying assumptions. In contrast, the EIA datast used in Table III encompass
a balanced panel of all utilities across all service territories and including all tariff
components. However, the EIA data require more identifying assumptions since tariffs
are estimated rather than observed. The section that follows explores the robustness
of the Table III results in greater detail. In the meantime, it is reassuring that Tables
I and III yield similar estimates for the bill smoothing coefficient.39
It is worth briefly noting the distributional implications of this smoothing. Sup-
pose citygate prices were to rise $1/mcf, and suppose demand were perfectly inelastic.
Then all customers on the standard residential pricing plan would see the volumetric
component of their bill total increase, by $1 times their monthly usage in mcf. Acting
against this effect would be a $0.38 decrease in their fixed fee. As such, there is no
distributional impact in terms of the level of the smoothing. However, in proportional
terms, the smoothing would be larger for low-usage customers – and larger for the
typical low-income consumer, as usage and income are (weakly) correlated (Boren-
stein and Davis [2012]). Using the mean usage across income quintiles reported in
Borenstein and Davis [2012], I calculate that the coefficient of $0.38 would translate
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into a 7.5 percent smoothing effect for the lowest income quintile, a 6.9 percent effect
for the middle income quintile, and 5.7 percent effect for the highest income quintile.
IV(iii). Robustness of Smoothing Results
In this section, I discuss and test for various potential issues with the empirical speci-
fication for the main results. If one were able to directly observe retail price structures
for a comprehensive panel, there would be less concern about specification error lead-
ing to bias. Because the previous results relied on inferring the price structure from
revenue and quantity data, here I evaluate (and rule out) various possibilities that
the effects are the mechanical result of the estimation procedure. The estimated
smoothing coefficient (on citygate price) is displayed in Table IV, which focuses on
the residential sector. Full estimation results, along with commercial sector results
and additional robustness checks, are given in Tables A3 through A8 in the Appendix.
[Place Table IV about here]
First I estimate the specification using alternative controls: including a quadratic
time trend, a cubic time trend, or weather controls (Columns 1 through 3). Spec-
ifications in the Appendix drop time-series controls; drop seasonal controls; include
year effects; include state-specific linear trends; or control for GDP growth and for
safety regulations taking effect in 2010 that may have impacted utility expenditures
(Hausman and Muehlenbachs [2019]). The negative impact of the citygate price is
robust to these alternative specifications, and the magnitude is occasionally larger
than in the main specification.
I next separate the sample according to the portion of homes in the state that
use natural gas for their home heating.40 If the elasticity along the extensive margin
(i.e., whether or not to have a natural gas hook-up) mattered, one would expect to see
differential smoothing across states with low versus high levels of natural gas for home
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heating usage, since the extensive elasticity is likely to be driven by whether or not
homes already have fuel-specific heating capital installed. However, the smoothing
effect is comparable across the two types of states (Columns 4 and 5). An additional
specification in the Appendix drops the three states with active and well-subscribed
retail choice programs; results without these states are similar to the main results.
I next verify that the results are not driven by various mechanical features of
the main specification. First I verify that results are not driven by the linearity
imposed on the quantity variable. Since some utilities use either increasing or de-
creasing block prices, imposing linearity on this mark-up coefficient could introduce
mis-specification. I include third-order polynomials for the quantity variables in Col-
umn 6; results for the smoothing coefficient remain similar. In the Appendix, I also
include two lags of the citygate price. The coefficients on lagged citygate are not
statistically significant, and the contemporaneous smoothing effect remains. Thus
the results do not appear to be driven by misspecification arising from omitted lags
in the main specification.
I next allow for an asymmetric smoothing effect by including a dummy for whether
citygate prices have risen year-on-year. The estimated coefficient is negative, consis-
tent with utilities, regulators, or customers being more concerned with rising bill
totals than with falling bill totals. However, the confidence interval is large, so this
result should be taken only as suggestive. Note the negative and statistically signifi-
cant coefficient on citygate price remains, indicating that the bill smoothing effect is
not solely present when citygate prices are rising (Column 7).
Additional robustness checks in the Appendix are as follows. I weight by either
customer counts or volume sold (time-invariant). I also separate the sample into early
(1989-2004) and late (2005-2015) periods. I next allow for heterogeneity in the pass-
through and mark-up coefficients to vary by state and by five-year blocks. Finally, I
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estimate the specification in first differences rather than levels. I estimate a negative
smoothing effect for all of these alternative specifications.
In the Appendix, I also use the survey data to rule out the possibility of price
endogeneity. In the main regression, finding an instrument for the price variable is
complicated by the fact that the cost variable, and its twelve lags, would also require
an instrument. However, in the more straightforward regressions using surveys of
fixed fees, I can easily instrument for the citygate price variable. In particular, I
use the average citygate price in the Census region (West, Midwest, Northeast, and
South). Table A2 presents IV results, which are essentially unchanged from the OLS
results shown in Table I.
Overall, while I have considered a very wide range of potential empirical issues, I
consistently find a negative impact of the citygate price on the component of revenue
that is not correlated with quantity, i.e. on the fixed fee. The magnitude of the
effect varies somewhat across these alternative specifications, with the lowest point
estimate -0.23 and the highest -1.18 (see Appendix). These estimates imply that 3 to
18 percent of the impact of a cost shock on a customer’s bill total would be smoothed
away. For the commercial sector, the coefficient on the citygate price ranges in the
alternative specifications from -0.75 to -8.88, implying smoothing of 1 to 17 percent
at the typical quantity purchased. These negative point estimates are consistent with
bill smoothing, matching the theoretical model as well as the anecdotal evidence from
the utility industry.
IV(iv). Frequency of Fixed Fee Changes
As described in the background section, volumetric gas cost recovery charges tend to
update every month, whereas volumetric mark-ups and fixed charges are changed only
every couple of years. This may explain, at least in part, why the previous sections
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found only partial smoothing of cost shocks via the fixed fee. In some months, zero
smoothing can occur because utilities are not able to adjust mark-ups and fixed fees.
At other times, such as during a rate case, fees may be able to freely change. There
may also be intermediate cases: times when a temporary rider can be added, removed,
or adjusted – but where the magnitude of the change is smaller than what is allowed
during a full rate case.
To understand the impact of this, I estimate the heterogeneity of the smoothing
effect across three groups of utilities, sorting utilities by how frequently they experi-
ence rate changes. Specifically, for each sample month for which I observe fee data
for the 40 large utilities described in Section IV(i)., I generate an indicator variable
equal to one if the fixed fee changed in nominal terms from the previous month. I
then calculate the mean of this variable for each utility/rate combination. The mean
is only 0.05 and the median 0.02: as described above, in a typical utility, fixed fees
only change every two to four years. I group the utility/rate units into three groups:
those with a low frequency of rate changes (fewer than one percent of sample months);
medium frequency (one to two percent of sample months); and greatest frequency (at
least two percent of sample months). Note that a comparable analysis cannot be
conducted using the EIA data from Section IV(ii)., since revenue data (as opposed to
rate data themselves) do not allow me to observe how frequently fixed fees change.
Results are shown in Table V. Recall that the coefficient when all utility/rate
combinations are pooled is -0.11 (Column 3 of Table I). The coefficient for the
‘medium frequency’ group is similar: -0.14, statistically significant at the five percent
level (Column 2 of Table V). In contrast, there is essentially no smoothing observed
for the utility/rate units with nearly flat fixed fees, as expected (Column 1). And for
the grouping of states with the most frequent changes (Column 3), the coefficient is
more than twice as large (-0.24) as the pooled coefficient.
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Two things are worth noting. First, it is essentially a mechanical result that the
coefficient in Column 1 is nearly zero – for the utilities in that sample, fixed fees are
not observed to change, so by definition smoothing is not observed. Along the same
lines, it makes sense that the coefficient in Column 3 is larger – since fixed fees are
observed to change more often, more smoothing is expected. At the same time, there
may be other unobserved differences between the utilities across the three sub-groups.
Overall, these results point towards an explanation for the partial smoothing ob-
served in all the previous results: the main results pool across rate case periods when
fixed fees are adjustable, and across periods when fixed fees are frozen.
[Place Table V about here]
IV(v). Modeling Expectations over the Future Citygate Price
One potential concern with the previous specifications is that the current citygate
price may not accurately reflect the expecations of the regulator over the future
citygate price. In a world where fixed fees are freely adjustable in all periods, this
might not matter; the regulator could simply continue updating as new information
about costs is revealed. However if the regulator is committing to a fixed fee that
will hold even as new cost shocks occur, then using the current price could introduce
measurement error. To examine this issue, I next model the regulator’s expectations
over the future path of the citygate price.
Unfortunately, an appropriate futures contract is not vailable. Futures contracts
for natural gas tend to be both upstream of the price paid by utilities, and to be fairly
short-term relative to the horizon over which fixed fees are frozen. For instance, the
natural gas futures prices reported by the EIA are for Henry Hub prices, up to four
months out. In contrast, I would ideally observe a futures contract at each state-level
citygate, for a horizon of at least a year.
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As such, I construct an expected future citygate price using forecasting regressions.
Conceptually, this procedure takes two steps: the first constructs a rolling average
citygate price, rather than a one-month spot price – since the fixed fee may be frozen
for a certain period, the regulator will care more about the average future price over
that period than about the price in just one month. Second, a forecast for that rolling
average citygate price is generated using lagged citygate price – in particular, just the
lagged prices available to the regulator at the time that the forecast is being created.
Specifically, in the first step I construct the rolling average citygate price over the
previous twelve months. So for January 1995, for instance, I average citygate prices
from February 1994 through January 1995:
MCit =
11∑
j=0
ωi,t−jMCi,t−j.
Here ωi,t−j are state-specific calendar month quantity weights (e.g., the average quan-
tity sold in Michigan in July).
I then regress the rolling average citygate price on the information available from
the previous year:
(7) MCit = η +
23∑
j=12
λjMC i,t−j + εit
So for January 1995, I regress the rolling average on prices from February 1993 through
January 1994. Results from this regression are given in the Appendix.
Finally, I forecast the following year’s rolling average price using the coefficients
from equation 7 and the most recent year’s prices:
M̂Ci,t+12 =
11∑
j=0
λ̂j+12MCi,t−j
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I.e., in January 1995, I use the vector of twelve λ coefficients and the February 1994
to January 1995 price path, to get a forecast of the average rolling price for January
1995 through December 1995.
This forecasted future average price can then be used in the smoothing regressions
to estimate the magnitude of fixed fee smoothing, in lieu of the current observed price.
I run the same regressions using survey data as in Table I and using EIA data as in
Table III. For space considerations, I show only the coefficient on the citygate price.
Results are given in Table VI.
If the spot price is not an accurate measure of the regulator’s belief about the
future price, then using it introduces measurement error, potentially attenuating es-
timates. That is, we would expect to see larger coefficients on the forecasted price.
Four of the five columns show a coefficient that is larger than the coefficient on the
spot price from the previous specifications. Column 2, for instance, shows a (noisy)
coefficient of -0.50, compared to -0.31 in Column 2 of Table I. Similarly, Column 3
shows a coefficient of -0.20, compared to -0.11 in Column 3 of Table I. Column 4 also
shows a larger coefficient: -0.47, compared to a coefficient on the citygate price of
-0.38 in Column 1 of Table III. At the typical quantity consumed, this corresponds
to smoothing 7 percent of a cost shock. However for Column 1, the coefficient is
somewhat lower than the comparable estimate from Table I, and for Column 5 the
coefficient is essentially identical to the comparable estimate from Table III. None of
the coefficients are statistically different from their current-price counterparts. Over-
all, it appears that a somewhat larger estimates of the smoothing effect is obtained
in regressions that allow the regulator to have more sophisticated beliefs about the
future citygate price than a simple random walk. However, the difference in the
coefficients is not economically significant.
[Place Table VI about here]
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IV(vi). Expenditures and Citygate Prices
In addition to the possibility of welfare loss on the consumer side, it is possible that
the price structures estimated in this paper have implications for utility operations.
One of the biggest expense categories for the typical utility is capital expenditures to
either upgrade or expand infrastructure. Other expenditures include administrative
expenses, meter reading, advertising, etc.
The previous sections showed that fixed fees, and therefore net revenues, respond
in unexpected ways to input costs. In this section, I examine whether expenditures
similarly respond to unrelated input costs. In particular, I estimate the impact of
citygate prices on capital expenditures. There is no economic reason to a priori expect
citygate prices to affect these expenditures—gas purchasing costs are a separate line-
item, and gas is not an input into infrastructure-related activities. As such, evidence of
an impact of citygate prices on these expenditures would be more consistent with bill
smoothing impacting the utilities’ ability to engage in pipeline network replacement
and expansion activities. Several of the anecdotes in Section II. suggest that this
might be the case in the wake of price decreases from the fracking revolution.
To answer this question, I use an annual utility-level dataset on expenditures for
large investor-owned utilities. For this subset (n = 207) of investor-owned utilities, I
observe data on capital expenditures41 at an annual level for 1998-2013 in addition to
quantity sold and average price by sector.42 While only available for some utilities,
these tend to be the largest firms; as such, this panel accounts for around 80 percent
of the residential and commercial volume distributed in the US over this time frame.
These data are reported to state-level public utility commissions, and they have been
assembled across state-level records by SNL, a provider of industry data. Summary
statistics are provided in the Appendix. I winsorize the right tail (the upper one
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percent) because the raw data show extreme outliers.
With these data, I regress capital expenditures on the citygate price, including as
controls utility effects and a linear trend. I additionally control for the quantity sold
across various sectors to control for territory expansions. I control for heating degree
days (HDDs),43 because cold weather is likely to impact both citygate prices and the
need for repairs. In particular, a severe cold snap increases demand for natural gas,
which combined with supply constraints can lead to spikes in prices. At the same
time, cold snaps can contribute to corrosion of pipelines as well as inhibit pipeline
repair.
Table VII provides results. Expenditures are per customer and per month, so the
coefficient on citygate price can be interpreted in the same way as the citygate coef-
ficient in Table III. Recall that for every $1/mcf increase in the citygate price, fixed
fees fall by $0.38 for residential customers and by $1.91 for commercial customers.
According to the results in Table VII, capital spending falls by $0.13 per customer
(statistically significant at the five percent level). The magnitude is smaller than the
smoothing of fixed fees; this is not surprising if utilities are able to save or borrow
funds. It appears that utility capital expenditures are indeed lower when natural gas
input prices are high, consistent with the anecdotes given in Section II.. The fracking
supply boom lowered natural gas prices by $3.45/mcf from 2007 to 2013 (Hausman
and Kellogg [2015]); the coefficient in Table VII implies that utilities in this sam-
ple increased capital expenditures by five percent as a result. Robustness checks are
shown in the Appendix; the result is somewhat sensitive to the time series controls
used.
[Place Table VII about here]
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V. CONCLUSION
The standard theoretical utility pricing structure involves a two-part tariff, in which
volumetric prices are set equal to marginal cost and fixed fees are used to cover fixed
costs. In this paper, I show that fixed fees are actually tied in part to marginal cost:
they fall when marginal cost is high, consistent with utilities’ and price regulators’
stated objective of preventing customers from experiencing bill shock. While fixed
fees are not directly observable for the entirety of natural gas firms, I use revenue
and quantity data to back out the average impact of natural gas wholesale prices
on residential and commercial fixed fees. I estimate that, at the average quantity
consumed, 6 percent of a cost shock is smoothed away, i.e. not reflected in bill totals.
In a model where price regulators face a penalty for volatility of bill totals, smooth-
ing cost shocks by varying fixed fees is welfare improving. Since marginal prices are
not impacted, quantity consumed remains at the socially optimal level. Note that in
contrast, hedging as a strategy to reduce bill volatility can impact marginal prices—
potentially impacting consumption decisions and thus welfare.
In the simple model presented in this paper, fixed fees would be used to smooth
100 percent of input cost shocks. That only a portion of cost shocks are smoothed
could reflect adjustment costs on the part of firms. For instance, firms typically enter
rate cases only every several years; in the intervening periods, prices are not fully
adjustable.
Although not modeled here, it is possible that welfare could decrease with fixed
fee smoothing. If consumers respond to average, rather than marginal, prices (as
in Ito, 2014), smoothing of fixed fees distorts consumption decisions. However, in
a setting where consumers respond to average prices, all two-part tariffs lead to
distorted consumption decisions, since average price is always greater than marginal
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cost.
It is also possible that fixed fee smoothing could decrease welfare if capital expen-
ditures are distorted away from the socially-optimal investment decision. Anecdotes
suggest that utilities do indeed adjust capital expenditures in response to wholesale
gas prices, and I estimate a small but statistically significant relationship. Thus it
appears that the timing of capital expenditures are distorted; whether the overall
level of expenditures is distorted remains an open question.44
Future research could examine the political and strategic processes by which rates
are set, with a focus on this smoothing behavior. Future work could also relate this
smoothing behavior to distributional questions in rate-setting. For instance, it would
be interesting to examine how the process plays out in Democratic versus Republican
states, in states with high portions of households below the poverty line, or in states
with high portions of elderly households.45
Several implications emerge from the results on fixed fees. First, these results
suggest that in settings with multi-part pricing, pass-through analysis should take
into account the entire price structure, not just the marginal price. The incidence of a
tax, for instance, will depend on not just on how volumetric prices change, but also on
whether fixed fees adjust. Second, the natural gas industry shows evidence of a form
of price stickiness (in average prices rather than marginal prices) that is consistent
with the previous literature on consumer antagonism. Finally, the results suggest
that price regulators, consumers, or firms value predictability of bill totals, consistent
with anecdotal evidence. Proposals to reform utility pricing by, for instance, tying
marginal prices more tightly to marginal cost (as in real-time pricing proposals for
the electricity sector) are likely to face resistance if bill volatility will increase. On
the other hand, proposals to reduce or eliminate volumetric mark-ups (and increase
fixed fees accordingly) could take into account the benefit brought about by reduced
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volatility (from quantity shocks) that this would imply for bill totals.
NOTES
1Retail prices are usually called ‘rates’ or ‘tariffs.’
2Gas ‘commodity charges’ are automatically-updated charges designed to reflect gas input costs.
3Citygate prices refer to the cost of natural gas at the point at which a utility purchases it.
Throughout the paper, I use the terms ‘citygate price’ and ‘input cost’ interchangeably.
4The name varies across utilities; it might be called a gas cost recovery charge, the gas cost factor,
the cost of gas, or a procurement charge.
5In my data, the median frequency of changes to the observed gas cost recovery charges is one
month.
6Also sometimes called a delivery charge, transportation charge, or transmission charge.
7Also called a customer charge, basic charge, or service charge. Sometimes related to a minimum
charge.
8In my data, the typical (both mean and median) utility changes its volumetric mark-ups every
two years. For fixed fees, the median frequency of changes is every three years and the mean is every
four years.
9Maryland Public Service Commission. Case No 8959. Direct Testimony of William B. Marcus.
June 20 2003. Accessed from http://webapp.psc.state.md.us/Intranet/casenum/CaseAction new.cfm?CaseNumber=8959.
10Cahill, Kevin. Re: CASE 05-E-0934 - Proceeding on Motion of the Commission as to the Rates,
Charges, Rules and Regulations of Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corporation for Electric Service
and CASE 05-G-0935 - Proceeding on Motion of the Commission as to the Rates, Charges, Rules and
Regulations of Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corporation for Gas Service. May 24, 2006. Accessed
from http://documents.dps.ny.gov/public/Common/ViewDoc.aspx?DocRefId={645401D8-F561-4146-
8EFA-1FBB61E9DBAA}.
11State of New Hampshire Public Utilities Commission. DG 13-251. Order No 25,633. February
28, 2014. Accessed from http://www.puc.state.nh.us/%5C/Regulatory/Orders/2014orders/25633g.pdf.
12Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission. Opinion and Order: Pennsylvania PUC v. Herman Oil
& Gas Company, Inc. June 11, 2015. Accessed from http://www.puc.state.pa.us/pcdocs/1365540.docx.
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13Michigan Energy Forum Comment. ‘Joint response from Consumers Energy, DTE Energy, and
MEGA.’ 2013. Accessed from http://www.michigan.gov/documents/energy/Additional Question 8 response from DTE Consumers
MEGA 419053 7.pdf
14Makansi, Jason. July 1 2012. ‘Innovation Required as Gas Displaces Coal.’ Power Magazine.
15American Gas Association. June 28 2012 News Release: ‘Natural Gas Utilities: Building and
Enhancing an Advanced Energy Delivery System.’ Accessed from https://www.aga.org/news/news-
releases/natural-gas-utilities-building-and-enhancing-advanced-energy-delivery-system.
16CenterPoint Energy, Inc. Form 8-K. March 26, 2015. Accessed from http://investors.centerpointenergy.com/secfiling.cfm?filingid=1193125-
15-106014&cik=1130310.
17A related phenomenon is the use of ‘budget billing,’ in which a customer’s monthly payments
are roughly equalized over the year, smoothing shocks associated with cold weather in winter. This
price structure frequently targets low-income users. Sexton [2015] empirically investigates this price
structure for a utility in South Carolina, finding that customers on budget billing increase their
consumption, which the author attributes to a decrease in price salience. Other related work includes
Beard et al. [1998]; Borenstein [2013].
18A related older literature looked empirically at how commission characteristics impacts regula-
tions (Hagerman and Ratchford [1978]; Primeaux Jr. and Mann [1986]; Besley and Coate [2003]).
19Regressions in the Appendix are suggestive of delayed and incomplete pass-through from the
upstream (Henry Hub) price to the reported citygate purchase price, consistent with hedging. See
the Journal’s editorial web site for the Appendix.
20For extreme examples of political pressure, outside the US context, see McRae and Meeks [2016].
21While the paper has focused conceptually on investor-owned utilities that are regulated by utility
commissions, note that similar political pressure from consumers might be expected for municipal
utilities.
22Note, however, that the simplified model abstracts from heterogeneity across customers. In
reality, smoothing via the fixed fee would not protect all customers from bill shock if customers are
heterogeneous and there is a single pricing structure.
23I.e., fixed fees could fall, stay flat, or rise, provided the rise in fixed fees did not outweigh the
fall in the portion of bill total from the volumetric price.
24For the natural gas market, exit from the market is possible for two reasons. The consumer
may decide to switch fuels (for instance, by using electricity for cooking and space heating), or in
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some states, the consumer could decide to switch retailers. Fuel switching towards natural gas is
expensive but has occurred in some parts of the country in recent years (Myers [2018]). Retail
choice is available in many states, but in practice participation is very limited in all but a few states
(Energy Information Administration [2011, 2017]). For analysis of retail choice in electricity markets,
including a description of the consumer inertia that limits participation, see Puller and West [2013]
and Hortacsu et al. [2017].
25The extensive margin could also matter in a setting with positive volumetric mark-ups, as
detailed in Borenstein and Davis [2012].
26A typical utility offers a low-income-specific rate, might have differential prices across regions
within its service territory, etc. Examples are provided in the Appendix and in Auffhammer and
Rubin [2018].
27The two most recent surveys are summarized in: American Gas Association, 2010, ‘Natural
Gas Utility Rate Structure: The Customer Charge Component – 2010 Update,’ accessed December
2016 from https://www.aga.org/sites/default/files/ea 2010-04 customercharge2010.pdf; and Amer-
ican Gas Association, 2015, ‘Natural Gas Utility Rate Structure: The Customer Charge Compo-
nent – 2015 Update,’ accessed December 2016 from https://www.aga.org/sites/default/files/ea 2015-
03 customercharge2015.pdf.
28The MLGW survey is not a random sample of utilities, nor is it even a balanced panel. Their
2016 publication reports that they ‘survey over 50 cities, including many that are geographically
close to Memphis, as well as utilities that are similar in size’ (Memphis Light, Gas and Water [2016]).
It is, of course, possible, that cities are selected specifically based on how their prices compare with
MLGW prices.
29That is, I calculate the fixed fee as: the bill total at 1 mcf minus one quarter the difference
between the 5 and 1 mcf bill totals.
30There are a few limitations to this dataset, applying to both the fixed fees and the volumetric
prices. First, the dataset contains information on some, but not all, ‘riders’ – temporary surcharges
(or occasionally credits) that do not require a full rate case. Second, the dataset does not contain
information on rates for anything other than the standard or default residential rate. For instance,
low-income pricing is not in the data. Similarly, some utilities have different pricing plans across
multiple service territories; in most cases, the dataset has only captured the plan for one service
area per state.
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31Further analysis of this is discussed in the Appendix.
32For the AGA data, I use the citygate price for the year prior to the survey year, since the surveys
were conducted in February.
33Customer count data are annual.
34These data do not appear to be available for delivery to the electric power sector.
35I use data on the 48 contiguous states. A handful (approximately 0.1 percent) of values are
missing; these do not appear to be systematic.
36Note that, because quantity sold has been included as an explanatory variable, the estimate of
ψ is net of any quantity impact of citygate prices via demand response.
37Of the 40 large utilities, 24 have a constant volumetric price, 4 have a non-constant price but
with a cutoff well above the mean quantity consumed, 7 have increasing block pricing (almost all in
New York), 3 have decreasing block pricing (all in California), 1 has a non-standard rate structure,
and 1 could not be located.
38Note the estimated volumetric pass-through of one contrasts with the survey results in Table I,
which found smoothing of the volumetric mark-up. This may be because the Table I results are for
a non-random subset of utilities. For instance, in practice the survey data over-sample New York
(25 percent of the survey observations, versus 8 percent of residential sales according to the EIA
data). When dropping New York, the coefficient from Column 4, Table I is estimated to be only
-0.04, and zero volumetric smoothing cannot be rejected.
39The robustness of the results to using either the survey data or the empirically estimated pricing
structures is also reassuring regarding the timing of the identifying variation. One might worry that
identification in this section’s regressions is very short-run, since it is driven by monthly deviations
from trend, whereas some of the intuition provided earlier was regarding, for instance, fracking’s
permanent shift to the supply curve. The survey results are reassuring for this concern, since they use
identification driven by longer-run price changes (annual in the case of the MLGW data; multi-year
in the case of the AGA data).
40These data come from the 2000 Census, which tabulates whether an occupied housing unit uses
utility gas, bottled gas, electricity, no heating fuel, etc.
41Additional categories of expenditures, such as administrative examples, are explored in the
Appendix.
42In principle, one could use this utility-by-year panel to estimate price structures at the utility,
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rather than state, level. In practice, having only annual data makes identification of the separate
price components (pass-through, volumetric mark-up, and fixed fee smoothing) very difficult.
43Defined as the sum over a year of daily degree days, defined as min(0, 65− T ).
44If the overall level of expenditures is distorted, welfare implications could also arise because of
demand elasticity along the extensive margin, as in Borenstein and Davis [2012].
45Related questions are investigated in the context of electric utilities in Levinson and Silva [2018].
43
This	article	is	protected	by	copyright.	All	rights	reserved
Au
th
or
 M
an
us
cr
ip
t
REFERENCES
Abito, J. M., 2016, ‘Agency Costs in Environmental Regulation: Evidence from Reg-
ulated Electric Utilities’, Working paper.
American Gas Association, 2015, ‘Natural Gas Utility Rate Struc-
ture: The Customer Charge Component – 2015 Update’,
https://www.aga.org/sites/default/files/ea 2015-03 customercharge2015.pdf.
American Gas Association, 2016, ‘LDC Supply Portfolio
Management During the 2014-15 Winter Heating Season’,
https://www.aga.org/sites/default/files/sites/default/files/media/ea 2016-
03 2014-15 winter heating season ea.pdf.
Anderson, E. T. and Duncan I. Simester, 2010, ‘Price Stickiness and Customer An-
tagonism’, The Quarterly Journal of Economics 125(2), pp. 729–765.
Auffhammer, M. and Edward Rubin, 2018, ‘Natural Gas Price Elasticities and Op-
timal Cost Recovery Under Consumer Heterogeneity: Evidence from 300 Million
Natural Gas Bills’, NBER Working Paper 24295.
Beard, T. R., Daniel M. Gropper and Jennie E. Raymond, 1998, ‘Bill Averaging
Programs and Consumer Behavior: Theory and Evidence’, Journal of Regulatory
Economics 13, pp. 19–35.
Beecher, J. A. and Steven G. Kihm, 2016, Risk Principles for Public Utility Regula-
tors, Michigan State University Press.
Besley, T. and Stephen Coate, 2003, ‘Elected Versus Appointed Regulators: Theory
and Evidence’, Journal of the European Economic Association 1(5), pp. 1176–1206.
Bils, M. and Peter J. Klenow, 2004, ‘Some Evidence on the Importance of Sticky
Prices’, Journal of Political Economy 112(5), pp. 947–985.
Boivin, J., Mark P. Giannoni and Ilian Mihov, 2009, ‘Sticky Prices and Monetary
Policy: Evidence from Disaggregated US Data’, American Economic Review 99(1),
pp. 350–384.
Bonbright, J. C., Albert L. Danielsen and David R. Kamerschen, 1988, Principles of
Public Utility Rates, 2 edn, Public Utilities Reports, Inc.
Borenstein, S., 2005, ‘The Long-Run Efficiency of Real-Time Electricity Pricing’, The
Energy Journal 26(3), pp. 1–24.
Borenstein, S., 2013, ‘Effective and Equitable Adoption of Opt-In Residential Dy-
namic Electricity Pricing’, Review of Industrial Organization 42, pp. 127–160.
44
This	article	is	protected	by	copyright.	All	rights	reserved
Au
th
or
 M
an
us
cr
ip
t
Borenstein, S., A. Colin Cameron and Richard Gilbert, 1997, ‘Do Gasoline Prices
Respond Asymmetrically to Crude Oil Price Changes?’, Quarterly Journal of Eco-
nomics 112(1), pp. 305–339.
Borenstein, S. and Lucas W. Davis, 2012, ‘The Equity and Efficiency of Two-Part
Tariffs in U.S. Natural Gas Markets’, Journal of Law and Economics 5(1), pp. 75–
128.
Borenstein, S. and Ryan Kellogg, 2014, ‘The Incidence of an Oil Glut: Who Benefits
from Cheap Crude Oil in the Midwest?’, The Energy Journal 35(1), pp. 15–33.
Borenstein, S., Meghan R. Busse and Ryan Kellogg, 2012, ‘Career Concerns, Inaction
and Market Inefficiency: Evidence from Utility Regulation’, Journal of Industrial
Economics 40(2), pp. 220–248.
Chu, Y., Scott Holladay and Jacob LaRiviere, 2017, ‘Opportunity Cost Pass-through
from Fossil Fuel Market Prices to Procurement Costs of the U.S. Power Producers’,
Journal of Industrial Economics 65(4), pp. 842–871.
Costello, K., 2016, ‘Vertical Arrangements for Natural Gas Procurement by Utilities:
Rationales and Regulatory Considerations’. National Regulatory Research Institute
Report No. 16-04.
Davis, L. W. and Erich Muehlegger, 2010, ‘Do Americans Consume Too Little Natural
Gas? An Empirical Test of Marginal Cost Pricing’, RAND Journal of Economics
41(4), pp. 791–810.
Davis, M. C. and James D. Hamilton, 2004, ‘Why Are Prices Sticky? The Dynamics
of Wholesale Gasoline Prices’, Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 36(1), pp. 17–
37.
Edison Electric Institute, 2016, ‘Memo: Primer on Rate Design for Residential Dis-
tributed Generation’, http://www.puc.state.pa.us/pcdocs/1423623.pdf. Memo to
NARUC President.
Energy Information Administration, 2007, ‘Impact of Higher Natural Gas
Prices on Local Distribution Companies and Residential Customers’,
https://www.eia.gov/pub/oil gas/natural gas/feature articles/2007/ngpristudy/ngpristudy.pdf.
Energy Information Administration, 2011, ‘Natural Gas Annual’,
https://www.eia.gov/naturalgas/annual/archive/2011/pdf/nga11.pdf.
Energy Information Administration, 2017, ‘Natural Gas Annual’,
https://www.eia.gov/naturalgas/annual/pdf/nga17.pdf.
Fabra, N. and Mar Reguant, 2014, ‘Pass-Through of Emissions Costs in Electricity
Markets’, American Economic Review 104(9), pp. 2872–2899.
45
This	article	is	protected	by	copyright.	All	rights	reserved
Au
th
or
 M
an
us
cr
ip
t
Ganapati, S., Joseph S. Shapiro and Reed Walker, 2016, ‘The Incidence of Carbon
Taxes in U.S. Manufacturing: Lessons from Energy Cost Pass-Through’, NBER
Working Paper 22281.
Gorodnichenko, Y. and Michael Weber, 2016, ‘Are Sticky Prices Costly? Evidence
from the Stock Market’, American Economic Review 106(1), pp. 165–199.
Graves, F. C. and Steven H. Levine, 2010, ‘Managing Natural Gas Price Volatility:
Principles and Practices Across the Industry’, https://bipartisanpolicy.org/wp-
content/uploads/sites/default/files/Managing%20Natural%20Gas%20Price%20Volatility.pdf.
The Brattle Group, prepared for American Clean Skies Foundation.
Graves, F., Philip Q. Hanser and Greg Basheda, 2007, ‘Rate Shock Mitigation’,
http://www.eei.org/issuesandpolicy/stateregulation/Documents/rate shock mitigation.pdf.
The Brattle Group, prepared for Edison Electric Institute.
Grubb, M. D., 2012, ‘Dynamic Nonlinear Pricing: Biased Expectations, Inattention,
and Bill Shock’, International Journal of Industrial Organization 30, pp. 287–290.
Grubb, M. D., 2015, ‘Consumer Inattention and Bill-Shock Regulation’, Review of
Economic Studies 82(1), pp. 219–257.
Grubb, M. D. and Matthew Osborne, 2015, ‘Cellular Service Demand: Biased Beliefs,
Learning, and Bill Shock’, American Economic Review 105(1), pp. 234271.
Guthrie, G., 2006, ‘Regulating Infrastructure: The Impact on Risk and Investment’,
Journal of Economic Literature 44, pp. 925–972.
Hagerman, R. L. and Brian T. Ratchford, 1978, ‘Some Determinants of Allowed
Rates of Return on Equity to Electric Utilities’, The Bell Journal of Economics
9(1), pp. 46–55.
Hausman, C. and Lucija Muehlenbachs, 2019, ‘Price Regulation and Environmen-
tal Externalities: Evidence from Methane Leaks’, Journal of the Association of
Environmental and Resource Economists 6(1), pp. 73–109.
Hausman, C. and Ryan Kellogg, 2015, ‘Welfare and Distributional Implications of
Shale Gas’, Brookings Papers on Economic Activity Spring, pp. 71–125.
Hortacsu, A., Seyed Ali Madanizadeh and Steven L. Puller, 2017, ‘Power to Choose?
An Analysis of Consumer Inertia in the Residential Electricity Market’, American
Economic Journal: Economic Policy 9, pp. 192–226.
Imelda, Matthias Fripp and Michael J. Roberts, 2018, ‘Variable Pricing and the Social
Cost of Renewable Energy’, Manuscript.
46
This	article	is	protected	by	copyright.	All	rights	reserved
Au
th
or
 M
an
us
cr
ip
t
Ito, K., 2014, ‘Do Consumers Respond to Marginal or Average Price? Evidence from
Nonlinear Electricity Pricing’, American Economic Review 104, pp. 537–563.
Johnson, R. N., 2002, ‘Search Costs, Lags and Prices at the Pump’, Review of Indus-
trial Organization 20, pp. 33–50.
Joskow, P. L., 1974, ‘Inflation and Environmental Concern: Structural Change in
the Process of Public Utility Price Regulation’, Journal of Law and Economics 17,
pp. 291.
Joskow, P. L., Nancy L. Rose and Catherine D. Wolfram, 1996, ‘Political Constraints
on Executive Compensation: Evidence from the Electric Utility Industry’, The
RAND Journal of Economics 27(1), pp. 165–182.
Kahneman, D., Jack L. Knetsch and Richard Thaler, 1986, ‘Fairness as a Constraint
on Profit Seeking: Entitlements in the Market’, American Economic Review 76(4),
pp. 728–741.
Kehoe, P. and Virgiliu Midrigan, 2015, ‘Prices are Sticky after All’, Journal of Mon-
etary Economics 75, pp. 35–53.
Knittel, C. R., 2003, ‘Market Structure and the Pricing of Electricity and Natural
Gas’, Journal of Industrial Economics 51(2), pp. 167–191.
Knittel, C. R., Ben S. Meiselman and James H. Stock, 2017, ‘The Pass-Through
of RIN Prices to Wholesale and Retail Fuels under the Renewable Fuel Stan-
dard’, Journal of the Association of Environmental and Resource Economists 4(4),
pp. 1081–1119.
Kolbe, A. L., Philip Q. Hanswer and Bin Zhou, 2013, ‘Reducing Rate Shocks’,
http://www.brattle.com/system/publications/pdfs/000/003/978/original/Reducing
Rate Shocks Kolbe Hanser Zhou PUF June 2013.pdf. Public Utilities Fortnightly.
Lade, G. E. and James B. Bushnell, 2017, ‘Fuel Subsidy Pass-Through and Market
Structure: Evidence from the Renewable Fuel Standard’, EEP Working Paper 014.
Leaver, C., 2009, ‘Bureaucratic Minimal Squawk Behavior: Theory and Evidence
from Regulatory Agencies’, American Economic Review 99(3), pp. 572–607.
Levinson, A. and Emilson Silva, 2018, ‘The Electric Gini: Income Redistribution
through Energy Prices’, Mimeo.
Lewis, M. S., 2011, ‘Asymmetric Price Adjustment and Consumer Search: An Ex-
amination of the Retail Gasoline Market’, Journal of Economics & Management
Strategy 20(2), pp. 409–449.
47
This	article	is	protected	by	copyright.	All	rights	reserved
Au
th
or
 M
an
us
cr
ip
t
Lim, C. S. H. and Ali Yurukoglu, 2018, ‘Dynamic Natural Monopoly Regulation:
Time Inconsistency, Moral Hazard, and Political Environments’, Journal of Politi-
cal Economy 126(1), pp. 263–312.
Marion, J. and Erich Muehlegger, 2011, ‘Fuel Tax Incidence and Supply Conditions’,
Journal of Public Economics 95, pp. 1202–1212.
Marmer, V., Dmitry Shapiro and Paul MacAvoy, 2007, ‘Bottlenecks in Regional Mar-
kets for Natural Gas Transmission Services’, Energy Economics 29, pp. 37–45.
McRae, S. and Robyn Meeks, 2016, ‘Price Perception and Electricity Demand with
Nonlinear Tariffs’, Manuscript.
Memphis Light, Gas and Water, 2016, ‘2016 Util-
ity Bill Comparisons for Selected U.S. Cities’,
http://www.mlgw.com/images/content/files/pdf/2016RatesSurvey2016.pdf.
Muehlegger, E. and Richard L. Sweeney, 2017, ‘Pass-Through of Input Cost Shocks
Under Imperfect Competition: Evidence from the U.S. Fracking Boom’, NBER
Working Paper 24025.
Myers, E., 2018, ‘Asymmetric Information in Residential Rental Markets: Implica-
tions for the Energy Efficiency Gap’, E2e Working Paper 021.
Nakamura, E. and Jon Steinsson, 2008, ‘Five Facts about Prices: A Reevaluation of
Menu Cost Models’, The Quarterly Journal of Economics 123(4), pp. 1415–1464.
Primeaux Jr., W. J. and Patrick C. Mann, 1986, ‘Regulator Selection Methods and
Electricity Prices’, Land Economics 62(1), pp. 1–13.
Puller, S. L. and Jeremy West, 2013, ‘Efficient Retail Pricing in Electricity and Nat-
ural Gas Markets’, American Economic Review 103(3), pp. 350–355.
Rotemberg, J. J., 2005, ‘Customer Anger at Price Increases, Changes in the Frequency
of Price Adjustment and Monetary Policy’, Journal of Monetary Economics 52,
pp. 829–852.
Rotemberg, J. J., 2011, ‘Fair Pricing’, Journal of the European Economic Association
9(5), pp. 952–981.
Sexton, S., 2015, ‘Automatic Bill Payment and Salience Effects: Evidence from Elec-
tricity Consumption’, The Review of Economics and Statistics 97(2), pp. 229–241.
Sibly, H., 2002, ‘Loss Averse Customers and Price Inflexibility’, Journal of Economic
Psychology 23, pp. 521–538.
48
This	article	is	protected	by	copyright.	All	rights	reserved
Au
th
or
 M
an
us
cr
ip
t
Stolper, S., 2016, ‘Who Bears the Burden of Energy Taxes? The Role of Local Pass-
Through’, Harvard Environmental Economics Program Discussion Paper 16-70.
Tappata, M., 2009, ‘Rockets and Feathers: Understanding Asymmetric Pricing’,
RAND Journal of Economics 40(4), pp. 673–687.
Viscusi, W. K., John M. Vernon and Joseph E. Harrington, 2005, Economics of
Regulation and Antitrust, 4 edn, The MIT Press.
Zajac, E. E., 1985, Perceived Economic Justice: The Example of Public Utility Regu-
lation, In H. P. Young (Ed.), ‘Cost Allocation: Methods, Principles, Applications’,
North-Holland.
49
This	article	is	protected	by	copyright.	All	rights	reserved
Au
th
or
 M
an
us
cr
ip
t
Figure 1
Bill Components for Two Example Utilities
Note: Each panel shows the nominal prices for three bill components: the monthly fixed charge ($ per customer
per month), the commodity charge ($/mcf), and the volumetric mark-up ($/mcf). In addition, state-level average
citygate prices from EIA are shown; the commodity charges track these closely. The two panels show two different
utilities, both large investor-owned utilities.
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Table I
Residential Bill Smoothing
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Fixed Fee Fixed Fee Fixed Fee Volumetric mark-up Volumetric gas cost
Citygate price, $/mcf -0.47** -0.31 -0.11** -0.10** 0.96***
(0.21) (0.22) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04)
Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time trend Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Dataset AGA MLGW Top 40 Top 40 Top 40
Cross-sectional unit Census division Utility Utility by rate Utility by rate Utility by rate
Frequency Annual, with gaps Annual Monthly Monthly Monthly
Observations 27 337 5,410 4,549 3,219
Within R2 0.63 0.08 0.17 0.04 0.75
Notes: Column 1 uses observations at the level of a Census division (n=9), covering the years 2006, 2010, and 2015; the data
source is AGA surveys. Column 2 uses an unbalanced panel of utility-level observations for 48 cities in the US for the years 2007
and 2009-2016; the data source is a survey conducted annually by Memphis Light Gas and Water. Columns 3, 4, and 5 use an
unbalanced panel of utility-level monthly observations for the approximately 40 largest utilities in the US for the years 1994 to
2017; the data source is tariff sheets collected by the author. Most utilities are represented by just one rate; a few have, for in-
stance, both a ‘heating’ and a ‘non-heating’ rate. Standard errors are two-way clustered by state and year in Columns 2 through
5. All prices are in 2015 dollars. *** Statistically significant at the 1% level; ** 5% level; * 10% level.
This	article	is	protected	by	copyright.	All	rights	reserved
Au
th
or
 M
an
us
cr
ip
t
Table II
Summary Statistics, State by Month Panel
Mean Std. Dev. N
Citygate price 6.48 2.57 15,547
Retail price
Residential 13.35 4.56 15,543
Commercial 10.05 3.01 15,532
Industrial 8.85 3.14 8,640
Revenue
Residential 76.68 56.69 15,543
Commercial 477.62 319.08 15,532
Industrial 55,084.89 81,094.80 8,640
Quantity
Residential 6.61 5.24 15,547
Commercial 48.48 29.18 15,532
Industrial 6,960.17 11,162.80 8,640
Customers
Residential 1,243,371.36 1,610,016.30 15,552
Commercial 103,205.52 96,291.30 15,552
Industrial 4,336.08 7,113.38 15,552
Notes: A unit of observation is a state in a month. The sample covers 1989 through
2015. Pricing data are available for industrial users only since 2001. Prices are in $
per thousand cubic feet (mcf). Revenue is in $ per customer per month. Quantity
is in mcf per customer per month. Prices and revenue are listed in 2015 dollars.
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Table III
Estimating Rate Structures, by Sector
(1) (2)
Residential Commercial
Pass-through:
Cost, MCitQit, in $ 0.42*** 0.45***
(0.03) (0.03)
MCi,t−1Qit 0.24*** 0.22***
(0.02) (0.02)
MCi,t−2Qit 0.11*** 0.11***
(0.02) (0.02)
MCi,t−3Qit 0.07*** 0.06***
(0.02) (0.02)
MCi,t−4Qit 0.04*** 0.05***
(0.01) (0.02)
MCi,t−5Qit 0.00 -0.01
(0.01) (0.01)
MCi,t−6Qit 0.01** 0.01
(0.01) (0.01)
MCi,t−7Qit 0.01 0.03*
(0.01) (0.01)
MCi,t−8Qit 0.02 0.03*
(0.01) (0.01)
MCi,t−9Qit 0.02* 0.01
(0.01) (0.01)
MCi,t−10Qit 0.03* 0.03**
(0.01) (0.01)
MCi,t−11Qit 0.02 0.01
(0.02) (0.02)
MCi,t−12Qit 0.03 0.02
(0.02) (0.02)
Volumetric mark-up:
Quantity, Qit, in mcf 3.03*** 2.71***
(0.26) (0.37)
Smoothing:
Citygate price, MCit, in $/mcf -0.38** -1.91
(0.16) (1.30)
State by month effects Yes Yes
Linear trend Yes Yes
Observations 14,942 14,931
Within R2 0.85 0.83
Notes: A unit of observation is a state in a month. The data cover 1989-2015. The
dependent variable is revenue, calculated as the revenue (in $) per customer per
month. Prices are in $ per mcf. Quantity is in mcf per customer per month. ‘Cost
per customer’ is the commodity cost (in $) per customer per month, calculated as
citygate price multipled by quantity per customer. Prices and revenue are in 2015
dollars. Standard errors are two-way clustered by state and by year. *** Statisti-
cally significant at the 1% level; ** 5% level; * 10% level.
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Table IV
Residential Bill Smoothing, Alternative Specifications
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Citygate price -0.37** -0.62*** -0.38** -0.33** -0.47* -0.38** -0.33**
(0.16) (0.18) (0.16) (0.16) (0.24) (0.16) (0.16)
Rising citygate indicator -0.63*
(0.32)
State by month effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Linear trend Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Quadratic trend Yes Yes No No No No No
Cubic trend No Yes No No No No No
Weather controls No No Yes No No No No
Sub-sample: <50% heating No No No Yes No No No
Sub-sample: >50% heating No No No No Yes No No
Cubic quantity control No No No No No Yes No
Observations 14,942 14,942 14,942 8,411 6,531 14,942 14,942
Within R2 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.84 0.86 0.85 0.85
Notes: The regressions for this table are identical to those in Table III, but this table displays, for space
purposes, only the coefficient on citygate price. Full results are in the Appendix. The primary specifi-
cation from Table III has been modified as follows: Column 1 uses a quadratic trend. Column 2 uses a
cubic trend. Column 3 controls for cooling degree days and heating degree days. Column 4 restricts the
sample to states with less than 50 percent of homes using natural gas for heating. Column 5 restricts to
states with more than 50 percent of homes using natural gas for heating. Column 6 controls for third-
order polynomials for the quantity variables. Column 7 adds an asymmetric citygate effect (see text for
details). *** Statistically significant at the 1% level; ** 5% level; * 10% level.
This	article	is	protected	by	copyright.	All	rights	reserved
Au
th
or
 M
an
us
cr
ip
t
Table V
Heterogeneity by Rate Change Frequency
(1) (2) (3)
Least frequent Medium frequency Most frequent
Citygate price, $/mcf 0.05 -0.14** -0.24**
(0.04) (0.05) (0.08)
Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Linear trend Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2,089 1,227 2,094
Within R2 0.03 0.06 0.59
Notes: This table uses specifications identical to Column 3 of Table I, but with hetero-
geneity by how often a utility’s fixed fee is observed to change (in nominal terms) from one
month to the next. The sample is divided into three groups. For the ‘least frequent’ sub-
sample of utilities in Column 1 (13 units in ten states), fixed fees change in fewer than one
percent of the months. For the Column 2 sub-sample (eight units in eight states), fixed fees
change in one to two percent of the months. For the Column 3 ‘most frequent’ sub-sample
(24 units in 11 states), fixed fees change in at least two percent of the months. Standard
errors are two-way clustered by state and by year. *** Statistically significant at the 1%
level; ** 5% level; * 10% level.
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Table VI
Using Forecasted Price
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
AGA MLGW Top 40 EIA, Resid. EIA, Comm.
Forecasted citygate price, $/mcf -0.28 -0.50 -0.20** -0.47** -1.92
(0.20) (0.38) (0.08) (0.21) (1.69)
Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State by month effects No No No Yes Yes
Linear trend Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 27 293 4,985 14,942 14,931
Within R2 0.57 0.08 0.19 0.85 0.83
Notes: This Table uses specifications identical to those in Tables I and III, but the following year’s average citygate
price has been forecasted using the last twelve lags of the monthly citygate price. Columns 1 through 3 match Table
I, and use AGA survey data, MLGW survey data, and tariff data for 40 large utilities, respectively. Columns 4 and 5
match Table III, and use EIA revenue, quantity, and cost data for the residential and commercial natural gas sectors.
See text for details. *** Statistically significant at the 1% level; ** 5% level; * 10% level.
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Table VII
The Impact of Gas Input Prices on Capital Expenditures
Capital
Citygate -0.13**
(0.06)
Utility effects Yes
Linear trend Yes
Observations 2,434
Within R2 0.04
Notes: Expenditures are in $ per customer per
month, and citygate prices are in $ per mcf. All
variables are normalized to 2015 dollars. Controls
include quantity per customer by end-user type,
and heating degree days. Coefficients on controls
are displayed in the Appendix. Standard errors are
clustered by state. *** Statistically significant at
the 1% level; ** 5% level; * 10% level.
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For Web Publication Only: Appendix
Supplemental Materials for Hausman, Catherine, ‘Shock Value: Bill Smoothing
and Energy Price Pass-Through,’ The Journal of Industrial Economics VOL-
UME(ISSUE), MONTH, YEAR, pp. XXX-YYY
This appendix provides additional tables and figures.
Pass-Through from Henry Hub to Citygate
Another form of price smoothing is via hedging, including physical storage of gas, signing
long-term contracts, or the use of financial instruments. To get a sense of how this im-
pacts the purchasing price that utilities report, I regress purchasing cost on the Henry Hub
price. Across various specifications (Table A1), pass-through is estimated to be at most 0.9,
suggestive of some form of hedging. Column 1 shows the immediate pass-through (0.76).
Column 2 shows that much of this comes with one-month lag. Column 3 shows that the
pass-through after one year is 0.87; Column 4 includes additional time-series controls and
shows a one-year pass-through of 0.79. Column 5 shows that, with an AR(1) process, the
long-run pass-through is estimated to be 0.91 (calculated as 0.26 / (1-0.72)). Column 6
shows that instrumenting for the Henry Hub price does not change the results; the instru-
ment, in the spirit of Hausman and Kellogg (2015), is the national average heating degree
days over twelve months. Across these six specifications, the largest estimated long-run pass-
through is 0.91 (Column 5). All specifications except the long-run pass-through in Column
5 are statistically different from one. This delayed (and possibly incomplete) pass-through
is consistent with some hedging on the part of utilities.
Allowing for Price Endogeneity
Table A2 presents IV results for the residential fixed fee smoothing using the survey data on
fixed fees. All three columns instrument for the citygate price with the average price at the
Census region level. Results are essentially unchanged from the OLS results shown in Table
1.
Price Data Collection
While no comprehensive dataset on utility retail prices exists, some price documentation
is publicly available online or by request from utilities and commissions. I searched for a
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time-series of rate documents for the largest utilities in the US.1 Information was collected
via a combination of web searches for utility and commission websites, contacting utilities
directly, and the Internet Archive (archive.org). I searched for data on fixed charges for
the 40 largest utilities, finding both current and historical information for 30, and current
or spotty information only for an additional 9. I additionally searched for data on variable
mark-ups and on gas cost recovery charges. I found historical mark-up data for 28 utilities
and current or spotty data for an additional 7; and historical gas cost recovery data for 20
utilities and current or spotty data for an additional 4.
The typical utility or commission provides two types of documentation: a table of changes
in gas commodity charges over time, and a “tariff book” in pdf form detailing the other
components of the prices, which tend to change less often. For instance, Con Edison (New
York) provides the information for March 2017 displayed in Figure A1. The left image
shows the “gas cost factors,” or volumetric commodity charge, for Con Edison, which change
monthly. The right image shows the “minimum charge (per month)” (in practice, akin to
a fixed charge) and “base rate... per therm” (volumetric mark-up), which tend to change
every 1-3 years. Other utilities tend to show comparable documentation.
The Con Edison documentation also shows some of the complications that arise when
collecting price data. The right panel of Figure A1 shows the pricing for “Service Classi-
fication No. 3: Residential and Religious - Heating Firm Sales Service.” Numerous other
price plans are available, including “general firm sales service,” “residential and religious
firm sales service,” “seasonal off-peak firm sales service,” “interruptible” rates, etc. More-
over, a comprehensive dataset would also need to account for additional fees and charges
(frequently called “riders”), including the “merchant function charge,” “revenue decoupling
mechanism,” “system benefits charge,” and “temporary state assessment surcharge,” each
of which carries its own time series of changes. These additional charges are widespread
across utilities, and they can appear as either volumetric or fixed charges. Finally, for the
case of Con Edison (and some other utilities), what is loosely described here as a two-part
tariff with a fixed and a volumetric charge is actually a minimum charge with an increasing
block pricing structure: that is, there is a fixed charge, then zero mark-up (but a commodity
charge) for the first three units sold, and a volumetric charge (both commodity cost and a
mark-up) for additional units rising with usage. In practice, the typical customer is likely to
use between 3 and 87 units, so I have elided the non-linear aspect of the volumetric fee.
Additional complications that arise include multiple service territories (in general, I col-
lected pricing data for the largest service territory) and additional service classifications (e.g.
1Largest according to the number of residential customers in 2013, the last year for which I have SNL
data.
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low-income pricing).
A comprehensive dataset would require tracking, for all utilities, changes in (1) fixed
charges, (2) volumetric mark-ups, (3) commodity costs, (4) additional temporary fixed and
volumetric surcharges, (5) non-linear volumetric prices—these would need to be tracked
for each service classification and each service territory, and one would need data on the
number of customers subject to each service classification. Each of these components could
be structured and reported differently across utilities, and across time within a utility.
In general, I have collected data on the standard or default residential plan; low-income
or other residential pricing plans are not included in the data. In some cases, I have collected
both a “heating” rate and a “non-heating rate.” Where it was clear what the main service
territory was, I have collected data only for that geographic region. If it was unclear, I have
included both regions as two separate cross-sectional units. Where possible, I have included
riders, but for several utilities these were not clearly available.
Estimating Price Structures
Table A3 provides full results for the tests of potential threats to identification, using resi-
dential sector data (matching the condensed results presented in Table 4). Tables A4 and A5
provide additional robustness checks. Tables A6 through A8 provide comparable estimates
for the commercial sector. Descriptions are given in the main text.
Expenditures
Table A10 provides summary statistics for the firm-level panel used in the capital expendi-
tures regression. While the data are annual, quantity and expenditure variables have been
divided by 12, to be comparable with the monthly summary statistics in Table 2.2 Summary
statistics are displayed for the 229 companies in the raw data; the regressions results in the
main text use fewer companies because of missing data.
Tables A11 shows the robustness of the expenditures and input cost results to alternative
specifications: alternative controls (Columns 1-3), using the region-level price as an instru-
ment (Column 4), and weighting (Column 5). The results are sensitive to the time series
controls (Columns 2 and 3); the coefficient is approximately zero if a quadratic trend is
used, but the coefficient is larger in absolute value when year effects are used. Results are
qualitatively similar when instrumenting for the citygate price (Column 4), but statistical
2The only variable not directly comparable with Table 2 is the customer count variable; in the state-by-
month panel, this is a count of customers per state, whereas in the utility-by-year panel, it is a count of
customers per utility.
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significance is lost.
Table A12 shows the same specification as in Table 7, but with alternative expenditures
categories. The expenditures data are broken out into multiple categories: distribution oper-
ations and maintenance (O&M); customer accounts, sales, and information; administrative
expenses; and capital. Distribution O&M includes, for instance, repairs at citygate stations,
repairs to customer meters, etc. Customer accounts, sales, and information includes such
spending as meter reading, customer accounts maintenance, uncollectible expenses, low-
income assistance, etc. I subtract uncollectible accounts from this category, since its value is
mechanically linked to the citygate price. As a result, this category has missing values—data
on uncollectible accounts contain missing values. Administrative expenses include salaries,
office supplies, etc. While negative impacts are estimated for capital, impacts for distribution
expenditures; customer accounts, information, and sales; and administrative expenditures
are small and not statistically different from zero.
Note that control coefficients (not displayed in the main text’s Table 7) are also displayed
in this table, in Column 2. The positive coefficients on quantity consumed, although not
statistically significant, are consistent with two possibilities: (1) service territory expansions
increase the number of customers and require capital expenditures; (2) a positive mark-up
means that additional sales will lead to additional revenue, which can then be used for cap-
ital expenditures. The negative coefficient on heating degree days is also consistent with
two possibilities: (1) cold weather might inhibit pipeline repair; (2) “weather normalization”
clauses in some jurisdictions are designed to undo the quantity/revenue tie previously men-
tioned. In these jurisdictions, additional HDDs would lead to additional consumption and
therefore additional revenue, but some of this additional revenue would be removed via the
normalization clause. To the extent these revenue changes impact capital expenditures, it
would imply a positive coefficient on quantity but a negative coefficient on HDDs.
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Figure A1: Sample Price Documentation, Con Edison (NY)
Note: The left image shows the “gas cost factors,” or volumetric commodity charge, for Con Edison, which change monthly.
The right image shows the “minimum charge (per month)” (in practice, akin to a fixed charge) and “base rate... per therm”
(volumetric mark-up), which tend to change every 1-3 years.
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Table A1: Pass-Through of Henry Hub to Citygate
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Henry Hub price 0.76*** 0.26*** 0.25*** 0.24*** 0.26*** 0.71***
(0.03) (0.05) (0.04) (0.03) (0.02) (0.15)
Henry Hub, lag 1 0.48*** 0.48*** 0.48***
(0.07) (0.05) (0.05)
Henry Hub, lag 2 0.06 -0.05 -0.05*
(0.04) (0.05) (0.03)
Henry Hub, lag 3 0.01 -0.00
(0.04) (0.03)
Henry Hub, lag 4 0.02 0.04
(0.03) (0.03)
Henry Hub, lag 5 -0.02 -0.03*
(0.02) (0.02)
Henry Hub, lag 6 0.06** 0.05**
(0.02) (0.02)
Henry Hub, lag 7 0.02 -0.01
(0.03) (0.02)
Henry Hub, lag 8 0.04 0.04*
(0.03) (0.02)
Henry Hub, lag 9 -0.03 -0.04
(0.03) (0.03)
Henry Hub, lag 10 -0.02 0.00
(0.04) (0.04)
Henry Hub, lag 11 0.07 0.07
(0.04) (0.04)
Henry Hub, lag 12 0.03 0.01
(0.03) (0.03)
Citygate price, lag 1 0.72***
(0.02)
Linear trend Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Quadratic trend No No No Yes No No
State by month effects No No No Yes No No
Observations 10,943 10,847 10,367 10,367 10,942 10,943
R2 0.59 0.63 0.64 0.80 0.84 0.59
F-stat 6.29
Notes: This table regresses citygate purchasing costs reported by utilities on the Henry Hub
price. The Henry Hub price, originally reported in dollars per mmBtu, has been rescaled
to dollars per mcf using a conversion factor of 1.037. Column 6 instruments for the Henry
Hub price using the national average heating degree days over 12 months. Standard errors
are clustered by sample month. *** Statistically significant at the 1% level; ** 5% level; *
10% level.
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Table A2: Residential Bill Smoothing, IV Specifications
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Fixed Fee Fixed Fee Fixed Fee Volumetric mark-up Volumetric gas cost
Citygate price, $/mcf -0.43* -0.41 -0.17** -0.10* 1.04***
(0.22) (0.27) (0.07) (0.05) (0.05)
Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time trend Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 27 337 5,410 4,549 3,219
Within R2 0.63 0.08 0.16 0.04 0.75
F-stat 245.90 221.17 1580.36 1630.69 1434.11
Notes: Column 1 uses observations at the level of a Census division (n=9), covering the years 2006, 2010, and
2015; the data source is AGA surveys. Column 2 uses an unbalanced panel of utility-level observations for 48
cities in the US for the years 2007 and 2009-2016; the data source is a survey conducted annually by Memphis
Light Gas and Water. Columns 3, 4, and 5 use an unbalanced panel of utility-level monthly observations for
the approximately 40 largest utilities in the US for the years 1994 to 2017; the data source is tariff sheets col-
lected by the author. Most utilities are represented by just one rate; a few have, for instance, both a “heating”
and a “non-heating” rate. Standard errors are two-way clustered by state and year in Columns 2 through 5.
The citygate price is instrumented with the Census region level (West, Midwest, Northeast, and South) aver-
age price. All prices are in 2015 dollars. *** Statistically significant at the 1% level; ** 5% level; * 10% level.
Table A3: Estimating Residential Rate Structures, Alternative Specifications
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Cost, MCitQit, in $ 0.42*** 0.44*** 0.42*** 0.38*** 0.47*** 0.42*** 0.43***
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03)
MCi,t−1Qit 0.24*** 0.24*** 0.24*** 0.23*** 0.24*** 0.24*** 0.24***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02)
MCi,t−2Qit 0.12*** 0.12*** 0.11*** 0.11*** 0.12*** 0.12*** 0.12***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
MCi,t−3Qit 0.07*** 0.07*** 0.07*** 0.10*** 0.03 0.07*** 0.07***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Quantity 3.03*** 3.14*** 2.98*** 3.59*** 2.35*** 3.10*** 3.06***
(0.26) (0.26) (0.29) (0.37) (0.26) (0.74) (0.26)
Citygate price -0.37** -0.62*** -0.38** -0.33** -0.47* -0.38** -0.33**
(0.16) (0.18) (0.16) (0.16) (0.24) (0.16) (0.16)
CDD -0.04
(0.05)
HDD 0.04
(0.10)
Quantity, quadratic -0.00
(0.06)
Quantity, cubic 0.00
(0.00)
Rising citygate indicator -0.63*
(0.32)
Citygate, lag 1
Citygate, lag 2
Observations 14,942 14,942 14,942 8,411 6,531 14,942 14,942
Within R2 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.84 0.86 0.85 0.85
Notes: This table is identical to Table 3 in the main text, with the following exceptions. Additional lags
(4-12) on cost are included as controls, as in Table 3, but are not shown here for space. All columns use
fixed effects and a linear trend with the following exceptions. Column 1 uses a quadratic trend. Column
2 uses a cubic trend. Column 3 controls for cooling degree days and heating degree days. Column 4 re-
stricts the sample to states with less than 50 percent of homes using natural gas for heating. Column 5
restricts to states with more than 50 percent of homes using natural gas for heating. Column 6 controls
for third-order polynomials for the quantity variables. Column 7 adds an asymmetric citygate effect (see
text for details). *** Statistically significant at the 1% level; ** 5% level; * 10% level.
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Table A4: Estimating Residential Rate Structures, Alternative Specifications
(8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14)
Cost, MCitQit, in $ 0.46*** 0.47*** 0.47*** 0.42*** 0.43*** 0.42*** 0.43***
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
MCi,t−1Qit 0.23*** 0.23*** 0.23*** 0.24*** 0.24*** 0.27*** 0.26***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.04) (0.04)
MCi,t−2Qit 0.10*** 0.10*** 0.11*** 0.11*** 0.12*** 0.13*** 0.13***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
MCi,t−3Qit 0.08*** 0.08*** 0.06** 0.07*** 0.07*** 0.05** 0.06**
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Quantity 2.44*** 2.62*** 3.21*** 3.13*** 3.08*** 2.85*** 2.94***
(0.24) (0.23) (0.30) (0.26) (0.26) (0.33) (0.30)
Citygate price -0.89*** -1.05*** -1.18*** -0.33** -0.51*** -0.37* -0.23
(0.29) (0.28) (0.24) (0.15) (0.16) (0.21) (0.18)
CDD
HDD
Quantity, quadratic
Quantity, cubic
Rising citygate indicator
Citygate, lag 1
Citygate, lag 2
Observations 14,942 14,942 14,942 14,942 14,942 14,942 14,942
Within R2 0.96 0.96 0.80 0.87 0.85 0.85 0.86
Notes: This table is identical to Table 3 in the main text, with the following exceptions. Additional lags
(4-12) on cost are included as controls, as in Table 3, but are not shown here for space. All columns use
fixed effects and a linear trend with the following exceptions. Column 8 has only state fixed effects as
controls. Column 9 has no seasonal controls. Column 10 uses year effects. Column 11 uses state-specific
linear trends. Column 12 controls for GDP growth and for PHMSA safety regulations. Column 13 weights
by customer count (time-invariant). Column 14 weights by volume sold (time-invariant). *** Statistically
significant at the 1% level; ** 5% level; * 10% level.
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Table A5: Estimating Residential Rate Structures, Alternative Specifications
(15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20)
Cost, MCitQit, in $ 0.43*** 0.45*** 0.45*** 0.42***
(0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03)
MCi,t−1Qit 0.23*** 0.22*** 0.26*** 0.25***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03)
MCi,t−2Qit 0.12*** 0.10*** 0.11*** 0.10***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03)
MCi,t−3Qit 0.06** 0.07** 0.05* 0.07***
(0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02)
Quantity 3.02*** 3.11*** 3.31*** 3.04***
(0.26) (0.41) (0.44) (0.26)
Citygate price -0.32** -0.86*** -0.60** -0.37* -0.33** -0.64***
(0.14) (0.18) (0.26) (0.18) (0.13) (0.20)
CDD
HDD
Quantity, quadratic
Quantity, cubic
Rising citygate indicator
Citygate, lag 1 -0.13
(0.23)
Citygate, lag 2 0.13
(0.16)
Observations 14,011 8,606 6,336 14,942 14,942 14,891
Within R2 0.86 0.80 0.91 0.85 0.87 0.82
Notes: This table is identical to Table 3 in the main text, with the following exceptions. Ad-
ditional lags (4-12) on cost are included as controls, as in Table 3, but are not shown here for
space. All columns use fixed effects and a linear trend with the following exceptions. Column
15 drops the three states with active and well-subscribed retail choice programs: Georgia, New
York, and Ohio. Column 16 is restricted to 1990 through 2004. Column 17 is restricted to 2005
through 2015. Column 18 uses additional lags on the citygate variable. Column 19 allows the
markup and pass-through coefficients to vary by state and by five-year periods. Column 20
uses first-differences of all variables. *** Statistically significant at the 1% level; ** 5% level;
* 10% level.
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Table A6: Estimating Commercial Rate Structures, Alternative Specifications
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Cost, MCitQit, in $ 0.45*** 0.46*** 0.45*** 0.40*** 0.50*** 0.45*** 0.45***
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.05) (0.03) (0.03)
MCi,t−1Qit 0.22*** 0.22*** 0.22*** 0.22*** 0.21*** 0.22*** 0.22***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02)
MCi,t−2Qit 0.11*** 0.11*** 0.11*** 0.10*** 0.13*** 0.11*** 0.11***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02)
MCi,t−3Qit 0.06*** 0.05*** 0.06*** 0.06** 0.05** 0.06*** 0.06***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Quantity 2.73*** 2.90*** 2.63*** 3.11*** 1.99*** 0.63 2.74***
(0.38) (0.40) (0.44) (0.49) (0.27) (1.29) (0.36)
Citygate price -2.14 -3.96** -1.90 -1.95 -1.53 -2.31* -1.59
(1.40) (1.57) (1.31) (1.76) (1.73) (1.19) (1.38)
CDD -0.15
(0.66)
HDD 0.68
(0.96)
Quantity, quadratic 0.02
(0.02)
Quantity, cubic -0.00
(0.00)
Rising citygate indicator -4.20*
(2.18)
Citygate, lag 1
Citygate, lag 2
Observations 14,931 14,931 14,931 8,411 6,520 14,931 14,931
Within R2 0.83 0.83 0.83 0.84 0.83 0.83 0.83
Notes: This table is identical to Table 3 in the main text, with the following exceptions. Additional lags
(4-12) on cost are included as controls, as in Table 3, but are not shown here for space. All columns use
fixed effects and a linear trend with the following exceptions. Column 1 uses a quadratic trend. Col-
umn 2 uses a cubic trend. Column 3 controls for cooling degree days and heating degree days. Column
4 restricts the sample to states with less than 50 percent of homes using natural gas for heating. Col-
umn 5 restricts to states with more than 50 percent of homes using natural gas for heating. Column 6
controls for third-order polynomials for the quantity variables. Column 7 adds an asymmetric citygate
effect (see text for details). *** Statistically significant at the 1% level; ** 5% level; * 10% level.
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Table A7: Estimating Commercial Rate Structures, Alternative Specifications
(8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14)
Cost, MCitQit, in $ 0.48*** 0.50*** 0.51*** 0.45*** 0.46*** 0.46*** 0.46***
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03)
MCi,t−1Qit 0.21*** 0.21*** 0.20*** 0.22*** 0.21*** 0.24*** 0.24***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03)
MCi,t−2Qit 0.10*** 0.10*** 0.10*** 0.11*** 0.11*** 0.14*** 0.14***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
MCi,t−3Qit 0.06*** 0.06*** 0.04** 0.05*** 0.06*** 0.06*** 0.06***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
Quantity 2.32*** 2.44*** 3.13*** 2.48*** 2.83*** 2.70*** 2.80***
(0.28) (0.28) (0.43) (0.32) (0.38) (0.36) (0.38)
Citygate price -5.12** -6.05*** -8.88*** -1.97 -3.48** -1.01 -0.75
(2.07) (1.98) (2.02) (1.38) (1.42) (1.66) (1.51)
CDD
HDD
Quantity, quadratic
Quantity, cubic
Rising citygate indicator
Citygate, lag 1
Citygate, lag 2
Observations 14,931 14,931 14,931 14,931 14,931 14,931 14,931
Within R2 0.94 0.94 0.77 0.85 0.83 0.82 0.83
Notes: This table is identical to Table 3 in the main text, with the following exceptions. Additional lags
(4-12) on cost are included as controls, as in Table 3, but are not shown here for space. All columns
use fixed effects and a linear trend with the following exceptions. Column 8 has only state fixed effects
as controls. Column 9 has no seasonal controls. Column 10 uses year effects. Column 11 uses state-
specific linear trends. Column 12 controls for GDP growth and for PHMSA safety regulations. Column
13 weights by customer count (time-invariant). Column 14 weights by volume sold (time-invariant). ***
Statistically significant at the 1% level; ** 5% level; * 10% level.
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Table A8: Estimating Commercial Rate Structures, Alternative Specifications
(15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20)
Cost, MCitQit, in $ 0.45*** 0.46*** 0.51*** 0.46***
(0.03) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04)
MCi,t−1Qit 0.22*** 0.19*** 0.23*** 0.22***
(0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04)
MCi,t−2Qit 0.09*** 0.10*** 0.10*** 0.08*
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.05)
MCi,t−3Qit 0.06*** 0.05** 0.05 0.06***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02)
Quantity 2.74*** 2.21*** 2.78*** 2.74***
(0.39) (0.40) (0.61) (0.38)
Citygate price -1.96 -4.75*** -5.81* -2.84 -1.86* -3.52***
(1.27) (1.57) (2.78) (1.92) (1.02) (0.95)
CDD
HDD
Quantity, quadratic
Quantity, cubic
Rising citygate indicator
Citygate, lag 1 -0.43
(1.33)
Citygate, lag 2 1.62
(1.81)
Observations 14,007 8,595 6,336 14,931 14,931 14,879
Within R2 0.83 0.76 0.87 0.83 0.85 0.74
Notes: This table is identical to Table 3 in the main text, with the following exceptions. Ad-
ditional lags (4-12) on cost are included as controls, as in Table 3, but are not shown here for
space. All columns use fixed effects and a linear trend with the following exceptions. Column
15 drops the three states with active and well-subscribed retail choice programs: Georgia,
New York, and Ohio. Column 16 is restricted to 1990 through 2004. Column 17 is restricted
to 2005 through 2015. Column 18 uses additional lags on the citygate variable. Column 19
allows the markup and pass-through coefficients to vary by state and by five-year periods.
Column 20 uses first-differences of all variables. *** Statistically significant at the 1% level;
** 5% level; * 10% level.
A-12This	article	is	protected	by	copyright.	 ll	rights	reserved
Au
th
or
 M
an
us
cr
ip
t
Table A9: Forecasting the Future Rolling Average Citygate Price
Rolling (Lags 11 to 0) Average Citygate Price
L12.Citygate price 0.44***
(0.01)
L13.Citygate price 0.07***
(0.01)
L14.Citygate price 0.04***
(0.01)
L15.Citygate price 0.00
(0.01)
L16.Citygate price 0.02*
(0.01)
L17.Citygate price 0.04***
(0.01)
L18.Citygate price 0.03*
(0.01)
L19.Citygate price 0.02*
(0.01)
L20.Citygate price 0.04***
(0.01)
L21.Citygate price 0.04***
(0.01)
L22.Citygate price 0.01
(0.01)
L23.Citygate price 0.04***
(0.01)
State by month effects Yes
Observations 14,397
Within R2 0.66
Notes: This table displays the coefficients on lagged citygate prices used for
forecasting. Specifically, a rolling-average citygate price (using up to 11 lags)
was generated, using seasonal quantity weights. This was then regressed on
the previous year’s 12 months of prices. These coefficients are then used to
predict the following year’s rolling average price. See text for details. ***
Statistically significant at the 1% level; ** 5% level; * 10% level.
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Table A10: Summary Statistics, Utility by Year Panel
Mean Std. Dev. N
Citygate price 7.58 2.38 2,666
Retail price
Residential 13.30 3.79 2,629
Commercial 11.40 3.11 2,625
Industrial 9.76 3.54 2,371
Quantity
Residential 6.49 1.84 2,666
Commercial 47.58 26.35 2,666
Industrial 5,778.13 11,683.51 2,666
Power Plant 111,957.71 320,432.13 2,666
Customers
Residential 308,180.56 583,831.14 2,666
Commercial 24,624.75 34,062.64 2,666
Industrial 988.86 2,897.76 2,666
Power Plant 8.14 53.79 2,666
Expenditures
Distribution O&M 6.90 3.21 2,578
Customer accounts, info, and sales 4.22 2.24 1,898
Administrative 10.50 7.26 2,577
Capital 10.30 10.44 2,440
Notes: A unit of observation is a utility in a year. For comparison with Table
2, the quantity and expenditure variables have been divided by 12 and thus
are monthly amounts per customer. The sample covers 1998 through 2013.
The subset of firms included is 229 large investor-owned utilities; see text for
details. Prices are in $ per thousand cubic feet (mcf). Revenue is in $ per cus-
tomer per month. Quantity is in mcf per customer per month. Expenditures
are in $ per customer per month. Prices and revenue are listed in 2015 dollars.
Table A11: The Impact of Gas Input Prices on Capital Expenditures, Alternative Specifica-
tions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Citygate price -0.19*** 0.01 -0.41* -0.12 -0.14*
(0.06) (0.10) (0.22) (0.08) (0.07)
Quantity
Residential 1.08* 1.01 1.12* 0.40
(0.60) (0.65) (0.60) (0.62)
Commercial 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.01
(0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.01)
Industrial 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00*
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Power Plant 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Heating degree days -0.26 -0.70** -0.78** -0.77** -0.34
(0.17) (0.33) (0.33) (0.33) (0.29)
Utility effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time trend Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Year effects No No Yes No No
Observations 2,434 2,434 2,434 2,434 2,434
Within R2 0.02 0.04 0.02 0.04 0.06
Notes: Expenditures are per-customer and in 2015 dollars. Observations are weighted
by the number of customers. Standard errors are clustered by state. Table is identical
to Table 7 in the main text, with the following exceptions. Column 1 uses no con-
trols other than utility effects and a linear trend. Column 2 uses a quadratic trend.
Column 3 uses year effects. Column 4 uses the region-level average price as an instru-
ment for the state-level price. Column 5 weights by customer count. *** Statistically
significant at the 1% level; ** 5% level; * 10% level.
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Table A12: The Impact of Gas Input Prices on Various Categories of Expenditures
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Customer Accounts, Adminis-
Distribution Capital Info, and Sales trative
Citygate price -0.04 -0.13** -0.00 0.02
(0.03) (0.06) (0.02) (0.03)
Quantity
Residential 0.24 1.11* 0.19* -0.30
(0.27) (0.59) (0.10) (0.21)
Commercial 0.01* 0.04 0.01*** 0.02***
(0.00) (0.03) (0.00) (0.00)
Industrial -0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Power Plant -0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Heating degree days -0.15 -0.76** -0.11* 0.11
(0.13) (0.32) (0.06) (0.11)
Utility effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Linear trend Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2,574 2,434 1,891 2,573
Within R2 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.02
Notes: Expenditures are per-customer and in 2015 dollars. Upper one percent expenditure out-
liers have been winsorized. Standard errors are clustered by state. *** Statistically significant
at the 1% level; ** 5% level; * 10% level.
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